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Environmental Law Outside the Canon
TODD S. AAGAARD*
It is time to rethink the domination of environmental law by a canon of major
federal statutes enacted in the 1970s. Environmental law is in a malaise. Despite
widespread agreement that existing laws are inadequate to address current
environmental problems, Congress has not passed a major environmental statute in
more than twenty years. If it is to succeed, the environmental law of this new
century may need to evolve into something that looks quite different than the extant
environmental law canon. The next generation of environmental laws must be
viable for creation and implementation even in an antagonistic political climate;
amenable to integration with other, non-environmental law; and able to make
inroads against the monumental peril of global climate change. Environmental
laws embedded in larger non-environmental programs and dispersed throughout
government offer an alternative model to the environmental law canon—an
alternative model that seems well suited to help environmental law address these
daunting challenges.
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental law has a clear canon of statutes that attract the bulk of attention
in environmental law cases, courses, and treatises. The canon consists of four major
anti-pollution statutes administered by the Environmental Protection Agency—the
Clean Air Act;1 Clean Water Act;2 Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA);3 and Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA)4—along with two other statutes, the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)5 and Endangered Species Act (ESA).6 Congress
enacted the statutes comprising the canon in the 1970s, during what has been called
the Environmental Law Revolution.7 At the time, environmental protection was a
bipartisan issue, and the major environmental statutes were enacted with
“overwhelming majorities” and “lopsided votes.”8 The new statutes were highly
ambitious in their aims, consistent with the idea that a revolution was indeed at
hand.9
In the decades since the Environmental Law Revolution, however, the optimism
that imbued the canonical environmental statutes has faded. Environmental law
suffers from a “mid-life crisis,”10 or at least a “malaise.”11 Environmental
lawmaking in Congress has stagnated. Despite widespread agreement that

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).
7. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in the Era of
Reinvention: The Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 717 (1999);
Robert L. Fischman, What Is Natural Resources Law?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 717, 720 (2007);
J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law
and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1459 (1996);
see also Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy,
1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 165 n.30 (“[T]here can be no doubt about the revolutionary
nature of the legislation.”).
8. See Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in Environmental
Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 1002, 1003 n.17 (2003); see also Richard N.L. Andrews, The
EPA at 40: An Historical Perspective, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 223, 224 (2011)
(noting that in the early 1970s “solidly bipartisan majorities [in Congress] vested this new
agency [(EPA)] with sweeping new powers”); Percival, supra note 7, at 165 (1997) (noting
that the major environmental statutes of the 1970s were enacted with “overwhelming,
bipartisan support”).
9. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (“[I]t is the national
goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.”);
Clean Air Act § 109(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1) (directing EPA to publish proposed
regulations prescribing air quality standards within thirty days of the statute’s enactment).
See generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 67−73 (2004).
10. See, e.g., Linda A. Malone, Looking Beyond Environmental Law’s Mid-Life Crisis,
23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 679, 680 (2006).
11. Holly Doremus, Reinvigorating the Union of Wonder and Power, 24 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 281, 281 (2005).
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inadequacies exist in the canonical environmental law statutes, Congress has not
passed a major environmental statute since the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990. Both parties have failed in attempts to pass their key environmental
legislative initiatives,12 and bipartisan legislative efforts on environmental issues
have been virtually unheard of. As the Breaking the Logjam Project has noted, “For
almost 20 years, political polarization and a lack of leadership have left
environmental protection in the United States burdened with obsolescent statutes
and regulatory strategies.”13 The political climate has become even more
acrimonious of late, as EPA has become a lightning rod for opponents of
government regulation.14
Meanwhile, although the canonical environmental statutes have resulted in some
dramatic reductions in pollution,15 environmental threats loom large. Many
environmental harms continue relatively unregulated.16 New regulatory challenges
arise as advancements in science identify new hazards.17 The threat from

12. See, e.g., Clear Skies—Legislative Information, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/clearskies
/legis.html (noting that the Bush Administration’s Clear Skies bill “never moved out of the
Senate Environment and Public Works committee in 2005 and was therefore never enacted”)
(last updated May 18, 2012); see also Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct.
11, 2010, at 70 (detailing the demise of the Obama Administration’s climate change bill in
the Senate).
13. Carol A. Casazza Herman, David Schoenbrod, Richard B. Stewart & Katrina M.
Wyman, Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New Congress and
Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2008); see also Laurie Ristino & Sam Kalen,
Is Environmental Law Serving Society?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 2012, at 52,
52−53 (“Little doubt exists that our middle-aged environmental programs are shouldering
challenges not particularly well-suited to their statutory frameworks.”); William
Ruckelshaus, A New Shade of Green, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2010, at R1 (“[T]he solutions we
devised back in the 1970s aren’t likely to make much of a dent in the environmental
problems we face today[,] . . . [even though] [c]onsiderable progress has been made thanks
to those early laws.”).
14. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Bashing E.P.A. Is New Theme in G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 2011, at A1; John M. Broder, House Votes to Bar E.P.A. from Regulating Emissions,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2011, at A17; Robin Bravender & Gabriel Nelson, Republicans Blitz
Obama over EPA’s ‘Anti-Industrial’ Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/09/28/28greenwire-republicans-blitz-obama-over-epas
-anti-industr-84657.html.
15. See, e.g., EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990, at ES2–ES-3 (1997) (reporting that the Clean Air Act reduced sulfur dioxide emissions by 40%,
nitrogen oxides emissions by 30%, volatile organic compound emissions by 45%, carbon
monoxide emissions by 50%, primary particulate emissions by 75%, and lead emissions by
99% as compared with what they otherwise would have been in 1990 without the Act).
16. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law,
27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 265 (2000) (“[F]arms are virtually unregulated by the expansive
body of environmental law that has developed in the United States in the past 30 years.”).
17. See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Nanotechnology and the Environment: What’s
Next?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2012, at 51, 51–52 (noting that nanotechnology is
an “emerging industrial hazard[] requiring safety research and regulation” and the
inadequacy of “existing applicable statutes . . . enacted at a time when the unique challenges
of nanotechnology were not yet contemplated”).
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anthropogenic global climate change, the worst environmental problem in human
history, continues to grow even as efforts to enact comprehensive climate policy
seem more and more beyond reach.18
Environmental law’s malaise in the face of challenges that would be daunting
even in the best of circumstances suggests that this is an opportune time to
investigate alternative models for environmental lawmaking. To do so, however,
requires rethinking the environmental law canon’s predominance within the field of
environmental law. Environmental law scholarship, practice, and teaching tend to
focus on the environmental law canon, to the neglect of other environmental laws.19
This inattention to environmental laws outside the canon is understandable,
because such laws do not compare to the environmental law canon in terms of size
or prominence. But noncanonical environmental laws are nevertheless an important
category of environmental law that deserves more attention for at least three related
reasons. First, noncanonical environmental law has distinctive characteristics that
cohere it as a category and differentiate it from canonical environmental law.
Second, noncanonical environmental law provides an alternative model for
environmental lawmaking that may offer significant advantages over relying
wholly on the environmental law canon to address the challenges currently facing
environmental law. Third, noncanonical environmental law, because it is atypical
of environmental law, offers unique vantage points from which to gain insights into
the field of environmental law as a whole. This Article proceeds in three parts, each
of which is affiliated with one of these three points.
Part I describes the topography of environmental law as a whole. Mapping the
field expands the recognized domain of environmental law beyond the canon. It
also helps to identify both common and distinguishing characteristics of
environmental law. Although environmental laws share some defining
characteristics, other key features distinguish among environmental laws. These
distinguishing features explain functional differences among environmental laws
and define useful categories of environmental law. In particular, environmental
laws outside the canon exhibit functional characteristics that differ markedly from
canonical environmental law, creating possible alternatives to environmental law in
its canonical form.20

18. See infra Part II.E.3.
19. Cf. Austin B. Caswell, Canonicity in Academia: A Music Historian’s View, J.
AESTHETIC EDUC., Fall 1991, at 129, 129 (asserting that “the tyranny of canonicity” can be
“destructive of our critical faculties”).
20. As Part I makes clear, environmental law includes laws at a variety of levels of
government, from international to local. See infra notes 64–71 and accompanying text.
While acknowledging this range, this Article’s examination of environmental law outside the
canon focuses primarily on noncanonical federal environmental law for three reasons. First,
federal environmental statutes outside the canon are an alternative readily available to
Congress, the lawmaking institution responsible for the creation of the federal environmental
law canon. Second, the possibility of state environmental regulation, because of the
federalism issues it raises, has not suffered from the same degree of inattention that afflicts
other environmental law outside of the canon. Third and finally, focusing on federal
environmental statutes outside of the canon gives the Article a more manageable scope. That
being said, state environmental laws, addressing issues ranging from pollution to fish and
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Part II focuses on a particular subspecies of noncanonical environmental law
that I call embedded environmental laws. Embedded environmental laws are
environmental statutes or statutory provisions embedded within larger programs
that are not primarily environmental and that are usually administered by agencies
not primarily engaged in environmental lawmaking—for example, the federal
excise tax on ozone-depleting chemicals administered by the Internal Revenue
Service,21 or limitations on the importation of illegally harvested timber
administered by the Agricultural Plant and Health Inspection Service.22 Embedded
environmental laws offer an alternative model for environmental lawmaking that
may help address some of the major challenges currently facing environmental law,
including legislative stagnation, integration of environmental law with law from
other fields, and policies to address global climate change.
Part III explores conceptual insights that the study of noncanonical
environmental laws can generate. Including noncanonical environmental laws in
the study of environmental law reveals a field that is more diverse in both content
and history than conventional accounts of environmental law that focus on the
canon. Noncanonical environmental laws also can, by virtue of their location at the
periphery of environmental law, shed light on some of the field’s existential issues,
such as defining the boundaries of what regulatory objectives qualify as
environmental. Such questions have practical as well as theoretical import—
whether a law is classified as environmental or some other category determines, for
example, what congressional committee and what agency are likely to control it.
An examination of noncanonical environmental laws reveals that the boundaries of
environmental law are blurry and overlap significantly with other fields. The
creation, study, and practice of environmental law should better reflect and address
this messy reality.
I. MAPPING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Environmental law encompasses far more law than the few federal statutes that
comprise the environmental law canon and that predominate in the field.23 The field
game to land use to water rights to renewable energy standards, exhibit a rich diversity of
features and warrant additional scholarly examination as a category of their own.
21. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681–4682 (2006). See generally Janet E. Milne, Environmental
Taxation in the United States: The Long View, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 417 (2011).
22. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 8204, 122
Stat. 1651, 2052–56.
23. For the purposes of this Article, the field of environmental law is defined to
encompass laws that reflect a consideration of human impacts on the natural environment.
See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy,
95 CORNELL L. Rev. 221, 263 (2010) (arguing in favor of this definition among several
alternatives). This definition is not limited to laws with the only or overriding purpose of
protecting the environment, because environmental laws reflect a balance of objectives,
including but not limited to environmental protection. This definition also excludes laws that
unintentionally affect the environment. Even accepting this definition, however, laws are not
necessarily susceptible to simple classification as environmental or not. For example, the
common law of nuisance is not aimed specifically at the environment, but it has important
applications to remedying environmental problems. See, e.g., State v. Ventron Corp., 468
A.2d 150, 157 (N.J. 1983) (holding under common law of nuisance that landowners are
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of environmental law can be classified into several categories based on gradations
of prominence: the canon, a subcanon of diminished prominence but still relatively
familiar laws, and finally noncanonical environmental laws, which are either
primarily associated with other fields or simply altogether obscure. Figure 1
represents these categories of environmental law as a series of concentric circles, in
order of increasing prominence as one approaches the center of the circle.

Non-canonical
Subcanonical

Canonical

Figure 1. Categories of environmental law.

Although all environmental laws share certain features in common,24 other
features vary among different environmental laws. These differentiating features
affect how the laws function. Moreover, the environmental law canon shares a
strong commonality of features not representative of the diversity of the field as a
whole. Because of differences in their characteristics, environmental laws outside
strictly liable for harm caused by toxic wastes stored on their property that flow onto the
property of others); see also infra Part III (examining how environmental laws outside the
canon help to define the scope of the field).
24. In previous articles, I have explored the features that environmental laws share in
common and that distinguish environmental law from other legal fields. See Todd S. Aagaard,
Environmental Harms, Use Conflicts, and Neutral Baselines in Environmental Law, 60 DUKE
L.J. 1505 (2011) [hereinafter Aagaard, Use Conflicts]; Aagaard, supra note 23. These previous
articles argued that environmental lawmaking is best understood as the management of
conflicts among uses of environmental resources. See Aagaard, Use Conflicts, supra, at
1525−27; Aagaard, supra note 23, at 264−69, 275. Environmental resources share certain
characteristics: they are physical; they are publicly rather than privately valued, owned, and
controlled; and they serve as media for pervasively interrelated ecological systems. See
Aagaard, supra note 23, at 264−69. Environmental problems arise when potential uses of
environmental resources conflict. See Aagaard, Use Conflicts, supra, at 1526; Aagaard, supra
note 23, at 275. Moreover, the characteristics of resources are such that conflicts, when they
arise, tend to be intense, complicated, and multidimensional. See Aagaard, Use Conflicts,
supra, at 1527. Here, by contrast to these earlier works examining commonalities among
environmental laws, my focus is on distinguishing among environmental laws.
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of the canon do not function the same as canonical environmental laws. These
functional differences establish noncanonical environmental laws as a distinct
category of environmental law, with the potential to provide an alternative model
for environmental lawmaking.
A. Differentiating Features
Apart from the features that environmental laws share in common,25 other
characteristics distinguish among environmental laws. These differentiating
features include the role of environmental protection, the specific subject matter,
the endpoints, the type of environmental media, the regulatory and nonregulatory
mechanisms, the targets, the form, the implementing institution, the level of
government, and the breadth. Different categories of environmental law exhibit
different patterns of these characteristics. One of the central challenges for
environmental lawmaking is matching the specific attributes of an environmental
problem with the most appropriate mix of features for the environmental law that
responds to the problem.
Role of Environmental Protection. Although a general goal of environmental
protection is a feature common to all environmental laws, environmental protection
plays varying roles in environmental laws. Some environmental laws are enacted
primarily to protect human health and the environment.26 Some laws are enacted in
part to protect the environment, but not necessarily as its primary goal—
mixed-motive environmental law, this category might be called.27 Closely related to
the role of environmental protection in an environmental law is the strength of that
protection and the degree of its departure from the status quo. Even among two
statutes focused on environmental protection, environmental protection has a
different role in a statute that calls for studying an environmental problem28 than in
a statute that imposes regulatory measures to remedy the problem.29

25. See supra note 24 (citing and summarizing my prior work examining features that
environmental laws share in common).
26. See, e.g., Noise Control Act of 1972 § 2(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4901(b) (2006) (“The
Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to promote an environment for all
Americans free from noise that jeopardizes their health or welfare.”).
27. See, e.g., Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012) (“It is
the policy of the Congress that the national forests are established and shall be administered for
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.”). Many other
laws significantly but unintentionally affect the physical environment—positively, adversely,
or both. Such laws are not part of environmental law per se, although they merit increased
attention from environmental law scholars, teachers, and practitioners. See infra Part II.E.2.
28. See, e.g., United States-Japan Fishery Agreement Approval Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-220, § 2202, 101 Stat. 1458, 1465 (1987) (directing EPA, in consultation with the
Commerce Department, to “commence a study of the adverse effects of the improper
disposal of plastic articles on the environment and on waste disposal, and the various
methods to reduce or eliminate such adverse effects”).
29. See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act § 4004, 42 U.S.C. § 6944 (2006) (directing state
plans to require the disposal of solid waste in sanitary landfills that comply with federal
regulations).
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Subject Matter. Although they share a common focus on the environment,
environmental laws address different subject matters. The most prominent
distinction drawn is between pollution laws and natural resource laws.30 Indeed,
because of strong differences between pollution laws and natural resource laws,
opinions differ as to whether natural resource laws fall within the field of
environmental law or instead constitute a separate but related legal field.31 Within
pollution laws, one can differentiate laws that govern pollution abatement from
laws that govern pollution remediation.32 Other environmental laws, such as laws
that address environmental processes and information33 and laws that restrict the
sale or use of substances,34 are not easy to classify as pollution or natural resource.
Differences in subject matter affect how environmental laws function. For example,
the conceptual paradigm for pollution statutes is regulating externalities arising
from the use of private property, such as the Clean Air Act’s regulation of air
pollutant emissions.35 The conceptual paradigm for natural resource statutes, on the
other hand, is regulating use of open access public resources, such as the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act’s land use planning process.36

30. See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of
Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 662 (2008) (referring to pollution and
natural resources as “the two main lines of environmental law”).
31. See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 7, at 718 (noting the debate and expressing the author’s
preference “to use the term ‘environmental law’ broadly to describe the subject encompassing
both pollution control and resource management”).
32. See Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46
IDAHO L. REV. 473, 487–88 (2010); see also Lincoln L. Davies, Energy Policy Today and
Tomorrow—Toward Sustainability?, 29 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71, 76–77 (2009)
(using slightly different terminology). Pollution abatement, such as the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act, “aim to reduce, or mitigate, pollution,” and pollution remediation laws such as the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) “seek to
clean up existing pollution, or to ensure its proper disposal.” Davies, Alternative Energy and the
Energy-Environment Disconnect, supra, at 487.
33. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321−4370h (2006 and Supp. V 2011); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001−11050 (2006).
34. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136−136y (2012); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601−2697 (2012).
35. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006) (directing EPA to issue
standards of performance for new stationary sources of air pollution).
36. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 202(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a)
(2006) (“The Secretary shall, with public involvement and consistent with the terms and
conditions of this Act, develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which
provide by tracts or areas for the use of the public lands.”). Notwithstanding the distinction that
can be made between externalities and open access resources, the two concepts are of course
related and often arise in combination. Pollution externalities, for example, generally operate via
the medium of an open access resource such as the ambient air or a waterway. See Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245 (1968). And the congestion effects
of overusing an open access resource are a form of externality. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a
Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 351 (1967).
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Endpoints. Environmental law encompasses laws that regulate to protect human
health as impacted by the natural environment,37 other human uses of environmental
resources,38 and ecological health directly.39 Many environmental laws regulate to
protect both human and ecological health.40 Pollution statutes generally have tended
to focus more on human health impacts than on ecological health, whereas natural
resource statutes have tended to focus more on ecological health than on human
health.
Media. Environmental resources are commonly classified into media—usually
water, air, and land.41 Many environmental laws aim at regulating specific
environmental media—for example, the Clean Water Act regulates water pollution,
the Clean Air Act regulates air pollution, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act regulates
contamination of soil and groundwater. Other laws, such as the Toxic Substances
Control Act, which regulates the safety of chemicals in commerce, are not
media-specific. Differences in physical characteristics across media have important
implications for regulating to protect that type of resources from pollution.42
Airsheds, for example, can be much more complicated to manage than watersheds.43

37. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (directing EPA to publish
national primary ambient air quality standards “to protect the public health”).
38. See, e.g., Clean Air Act §§ 169A–169B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7491–7492 (establishing program
to improve visibility in certain designated areas where “visibility is an important value”).
39. See, e.g., ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (2012) (stating Congress’s policy under
the ESA “to conserve endangered species and threatened species”).
40. See, e.g., TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2012) (authorizing EPA to regulate
substances that “present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment”); Clean
Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2006) (establishing “the national goal that wherever
attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of
fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water”); RCRA
§ 1003(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(4) (2006) (stating an objective of “assuring that hazardous
waste management practices are conducted in a manner which protects human health and the
environment”); CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2006) (authorizing the Attorney
General to file an action in federal district court in the case of “an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or
threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility”).
41. See, e.g., Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrated Environmental Control: The Expanding
Matrix, 22 ENVTL. L. 77, 83 (1992); Nigel D. Key & Jonathan D. Kaplan, Multiple
Environmental Externalities and Manure Management Policy, 32 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON.
115, 115 (2007); Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law and the Supreme Court: Three Years
Later, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653, 662 (2002).
42. Cf. LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 71−72 (explaining that the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act were each “reflective of the distinct physical features of the [type of pollution] it
addressed”).
43. Rich Poirot, Paul Wishinski, Bret Schichtel & Phil Girton, Air Trajectory Pollution
Climatology for the Lake Champlain Basin, in LAKE CHAMPLAIN IN TRANSITION: FROM
RESEARCH TOWARD RESTORATION 25, 25−26 (Thomas O. Manley & Patricia L. Manley, eds.,
1999) (noting that the Lake Champlain watershed is “clearly defined by fixed geographical
boundaries,” whereas “the spatial and temporal variations of emission sources and
meteorological conditions, make it virtually impossible to develop a fixed definition of airshed”
(emphasis in original)). Even where environmental laws attempt to regulate specifically to
particular media, environmental media cannot be fully segregated. Contaminants in air pollution,
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Mechanisms. Environmental laws employ a variety of regulatory and
nonregulatory mechanisms, including environmental quality-based standards,
emissions limits based on technology standards, tradable emissions permitting,
pollution charges, liability, information reporting and disclosure requirements, use
limitations, subsidies, and technical assistance.44 Many environmental statutes include
a combination of multiple mechanisms, and major environmental statutes may
include virtually all of them in some form.45
Regulatory Targets. Some environmental laws regulate the private sector
directly,46 and some regulate government action qua sovereign.47 Many statutes
involve a mix of governmental and private sector regulatory targets. Most of the
major environmental statutes regulate federal facilities as well as privately owned and
operated pollution sources.48 Statutes that ultimately aim at regulating private sector
conduct may include detailed requirements for the government agencies that
implement them.49 Statutes that regulate government action qua sovereign indirectly
regulate the private sector—for example, if NEPA requires the Army Corps of
Engineers to prepare an Environmental Assessment before granting a permit allowing
a private developer to fill a wetland,50 then the developer feels the regulatory effects
of NEPA as much as, if not more than, the Corps of Engineers does.
Form. Environmental laws take a variety of forms, including treaties,51
statutes,52 administrative regulations,53 court decisions,54 and common law
for example, can pollute water or land through atmospheric deposition. See Gary M. Lovett,
Atmospheric Deposition of Nutrients and Pollutants in North America: An Ecological
Perspective, 4 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 629 (1994).
44. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-ENV-634, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY TOOLS: A USER’S GUIDE 81−142 (1995).
45. See Andrews, supra note 8, at 231–32 (noting the different regulatory mechanisms
Congress enacted in the new federal environmental statutes of the 1970s).
46. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006) (prohibiting, with certain
specified exceptions, “the discharge of any pollutant by any person”).
47. See, e.g., NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006) (directing federal agencies to
prepare environmental impact statements for proposed major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the environment).
48. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (providing that federal facilities
“shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water
pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity”); Clean Air
Act § 118(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (2006) (providing that federal facilities “shall be subject to, and
comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and
process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of air pollution in the same manner,
and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity”).
49. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (requiring a state
seeking EPA approval of its state implementation plans to provide assurances that it “will have
adequate personnel, funding, and authority . . . to carry out such implementation plan”).
50. See, e.g., Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1274 (10th Cir. 2004).
51. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.
52. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
53. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R.
54. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007); Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
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doctrines.55 Although environmental laws are generally easily classified by form,56
the different forms are also highly interrelated. Statutes may implement treaties.57
Administrative regulations implement statutes.58 Courts’ interpretations of statutes
become functionally part of the statutes themselves.59 Statutes may incorporate
common law doctrines.60
Implementing Institution. Environmental laws are implemented by different
institutions. Some environmental laws, such as common law environmental torts, are
primarily implemented by private parties and courts through litigation. Most
environmental laws, however, are implemented by an administrative agency of some
form. Within this category, there is substantial diversity. It matters to the functioning
of a law whether its implementation is controlled by, for example, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the purpose of which is to effect environmental protection;61 a
resource agency, such as the Army Corps of Engineers or Forest Service, which has
more diverse goals and traditionally has been oriented toward economic exploitation
of natural resources;62 or an agency such as the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, which has not traditionally focused on environmental issues.63

55. See, e.g., Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011)
(asserting claims under the federal common law of public nuisance against federal and city
agencies for allegedly managing the Chicago Area Waterway System in a manner that will allow
invasive carp to move into the Great Lakes, causing an ecological disaster).
56. But see, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 643 F.3d 311, 320−21 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(holding that an EPA guidance document was actually a legislative rule that required notice and
comment).
57. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671–7671q (2006) (implementing the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer).
58. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1–1517.7 (implementing the National Environmental
Policy Act).
59. See, e.g., Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 117−18 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (interpreting the language of Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7521(a)(1) (2006), in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497 (2007)).
60. See, e.g., In re Bell Petrol. Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that
Congress intended courts to draw on “traditional and evolving common law principles” to
determine the scope of liability under CERCLA).
61. Our Mission and What We Do, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and
-what-we-do (last updated June 3, 2013) (“The mission of EPA is to protect human health and
the environment.”).
62. See, e.g., Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012) (“It is
the policy of the Congress that the national forests are established and shall be administered for
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.”); Water Resources
Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, 114 Stat. 2572 (2000) (authorizing the Corps of
Engineers to undertake projects to, among other things, reduce flood damage, improve
navigation, upgrade hydroelectric power generating facilities, restore aquatic ecosystems, and
enhance beach recreation).
63. The extent to which an agency has an environmental mission and environmental
expertise can change significantly. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service exemplify agencies that over time have been delegated more
environmental responsibilities and have in turn responded by increasing their environmental
expertise.
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Level of Government. Environmental laws originate at all different levels of
government—for example, international,64 national,65 state,66 and local.67 On the
other hand, national environmental laws sometimes implement international
treaties,68 state environmental statutes are often modeled on federal environmental
statutes,69 and federal environmental statutes often employ cooperative federalism
that allows state environmental programs to implement federal statutes,70 somewhat
undercutting the distinction between the different levels.71
Breadth. Environmental laws vary in scope from narrowly targeted72 to
extremely expansive.73 The breadth of an environmental law depends largely on its
other characteristics, such as the subject matter and level of government. Breadth
affects, in turn, the magnitude of the costs and benefits of a law and the resources
needed to implement it.
B. Categories of Prominence
Having identified features that differentiate among environmental laws, we can
move to the tasks of pinpointing those environmental laws that comprise the

64. E.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra note 51;
Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area,
U.S.-Mex., Aug. 14, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 1025.
65. See, e.g., statutes cited supra notes 1−6.
66. E.g., Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6020.101−.1305
(West 2012).
67. See, e.g., Noise Control Ordinance of the County of Los Angeles, L.A., CAL., L.A.
COUNTY CODE §§ 12.08.010−.680.
68. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671–7671q (2006 & Supp. 2011) (implementing the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer).
69. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6301–6309 (2011) (adopting hazardous waste
management provisions similar to RCRA).
70. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006) (allowing EPA to
authorize state water pollution discharge permit programs implementing the Federal Clean
Water Act).
71. Robert Fischman undertook a somewhat similar analysis in a 2008 article in which
he identified certain attributes that distinguish among environmental laws. See Fischman,
supra note 30. Fischman distinguished pollution control versus resource management subject
matters, categorical versus utilitarian regulatory approaches, statutory detail versus agency
latitude, and Commerce Clause versus Property Clause constitutional authority. See id. at
666–84. As opposed to mapping the field generally, Fischman focused on how these features
“distinguish the two main lines of environmental law [pollution law and natural resources
law] from each other.” Id. at 662 (emphasis in original).
72. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 262m-4 (2006) (supporting “the strengthening of educational
programs within each multilateral development bank to improve the capacity of mid-level
managers to initiate and manage environmental aspects of development activities, and to
train officials of borrowing countries in the conduct of environmental analyses”).
73. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006) (“Except as in compliance with this section
and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”).
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environmental law canon and comparing them to other environmental laws in terms
of the differentiating features.
1. Environmental Law Canon
This Subpart defines the environmental law canon, identifies those
environmental laws that comprise the canon, and then assesses the canon in terms
of the differentiating features discussed in Part I.A, demonstrating a strong
commonality of certain characteristics across the canon that is not shared by the
field of environmental law as a whole.
Attempting to define which environmental laws comprise the canon necessitates
first defining what we mean by the canon. “What is ‘canonical’ in law varies
according to how the canon is defined, and how the canon is defined depends on
the purpose of the canon.”74 In general, canon connotes a prominence and
significance of certain items among a broader set. Beyond this commonality, canon
has several related but different meanings in contemporary common usage.75 This
paper uses canon in the sense of a collection of the most important items in a field.
Important laws are not necessarily good laws, and so canon as used here is
primarily descriptive rather than normative.76 Although there may be various ways
of assessing the prominence and importance of laws to their legal field, which
could in some cases lead to uncertainty and disagreement about which laws
constitute a canon, the most obvious measures of prominence in environmental law

74. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 963, 975 (1998).
75. Cf. id. at 968 n.24 (tracing the etymology and historical usage of the term). Different
specific meanings involve different measures of significance or different types of items
being sorted. Canon can mean a collection of the most important items in a field. See David
Fontana, A Case for the Twenty-First Century Constitutional Canon: Schneiderman v.
United States, 35 CONN. L. REV. 35, 90 n.10 (2002) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 198
(7th ed. 1999)); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 825
(2004). Canon can refer to a fundamental legal principle. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 234
(9th ed. 2009); see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315,
316 (2000); Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
1389, 1390 (2005). A canon can be an important theme or way of thinking about a field. See
Hasday, supra, at 825; Mark Tushnet, The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law: An Introduction,
17 CONST. COMMENT. 187, 187 (2000). Canon can mean “an authority that can be invoked in
the face of almost any counterevidence because it is its own evidence and stronger in its
force than any other”—that is, an authority that “stops inquiry.” Stanley Fish, Not of an Age,
but for All Time: Canons and Postmodernism, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 12 (1993). Finally,
canon law refers to a body of law developed within a particular religious tradition. See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (9th ed. 2009); see also, e.g., George La Piana, Book
Review, 49 HARV. L. REV. 855, 855 (1936).
76. That being said, a highly beneficial law is hopefully more likely to thrive and take
on importance than a poorly functioning law, so there probably is some correlation between
the normative value of a law and whether it is prominent and therefore canonical. Cf. infra
note 295 (noting that even identifying certain characteristics as salient makes an indirectly
normative evaluation).
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all point to a group of six federal environmental statutes that dominates the
teaching and practice of what is generally regarded as environmental law:
•

Clean Air Act (CAA),77 the primary federal air pollution statute;

•

Clean Water Act (CWA),78 the primary federal water pollution statute;

•

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA),79 which authorizes the cleanup of environmental
contamination and imposes liability for such cleanups;

•

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),80 which regulates the
generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous
waste;

•

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),81 which requires federal
agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of their proposed actions;
and

•

Endangered Species Act (ESA),82 which regulates activities that harm
threatened or endangered species.

As Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate, these six statutes are far more likely than other
environmental laws to be mentioned in cases, law review articles, and casebooks:

Figure 2. Frequency of mention in cases by statute.83

77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
78. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
82. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).
83. Figure 2 indicates the number of state and federal cases decided since January 1,
2000, that mention each statute. Searches were run in the Westlaw and LexisNexis databases
of all state and federal cases; the numbers reported are the average of the two databases.
“NFMA” refers to the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614
(2012). “FLPMA” refers to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1701–1787 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). “FIFRA” refers to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012). “OPA” refers to the Oil Pollution Act of
1980, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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Figure 3. Frequency of mention in law review articles by statute.84

Figure 4. Frequency of substantial coverage in casebooks by statute.85

84. Figure 3 indicates the number of law review articles published since January 1,
2000, that mention each statute. Searches were run in the Westlaw and LexisNexis databases
of all U.S. and Canadian law journals; the numbers reported are the average of the two
databases. “SDWA” refers to the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26
(2006). “Kyoto” refers to the Kyoto Protocol. “GATT” refers to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade.
85. Figure 4 indicates the frequency with which federal environmental statutes are
substantially covered in ten leading environmental law casebooks. See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT (3d ed. 2012); HOLLY DOREMUS, ALBERT C. LIN & RONALD
H. ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND READINGS (6th ed.
2012); DANIEL A. FARBER, JODY FREEMAN & ANN E. CARLSON., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (8th ed. 2010); ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY (4th ed. 2003); CRAIG N. JOHNSTON, WILLIAM F. FUNK &
VICTOR B. FLATT, LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT (3d ed. 2010); LINDA A. MALONE
& WILLIAM M. TABB, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2011); PETER S.
MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1994); ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY (6th ed. 2009); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H.
ABRAMS, ROBERT L. GRAHAM, LISA HEINZERLING, DAVID A. WIRTH & NOAH D. HALL,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY (4th ed. 2010); RICHARD L.
REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2012).
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These data show that when lawyers, scholars, and teachers practice, think, and
teach about the field of environmental law, they do so primarily with reference to a
relatively small set of common materials. Unlike other legal fields in which there
may be a divergence among what materials are taught in law school courses, the
materials requisite for knowledgeable participation in civic debate, and the
materials important to legal academics,86 in the field of environmental law a
common set of materials predominates in all three of these forums. These statutes
comprise the environmental law canon.
Comparing the six statutes in the environmental law canon to the various
characteristics that differentiate among environmental laws,87 the environmental
law canon generally shares five characteristics in common—the role of
environmental protection, the subject matter, the form of law, the level of
government, and the institution charged with implementation:
•

Laws in the environmental law canon are enacted primarily for the
purpose of protecting the environment.

•

Canonical environmental laws generally—but not universally88—address
pollution.

•

Canonical environmental laws are statutes, including the progeny of
statutes such as administrative regulations implementing a statute or cases
interpreting a statute or regulation.

•

Laws in the environmental law canon are national laws.

•

EPA administers most laws in the environmental law canon.

In addition to sharing these functional attributes, the environmental law canon
also shares a common historical pedigree. The statutes that comprise the
environmental law canon are the product of the “Environmental Revolution”89 of
the 1970s, which encompassed the first Earth Day,90 enactment of most of the

86. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson refer to these respectively as the “pedagogical
canon,” “cultural literacy canon,” and the “academic theory canon.” Balkin & Levinson,
supra note 74, at 975–76.
87. See supra Part I.A.
88. See infra Part I.B.2 (describing the special cases of NEPA and the Endangered
Species Act).
89. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 395, 396 (1995); Denis Hayes, Environmental Law and Millennial Politics,
25 ENVTL. L. 953, 964 (1995); Wallace E. Oates, On Environmental Federalism, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1321, 1328 (1997); see also Doremus, supra note 7, at 717 (referring to the
“environmental law revolution”); Fischman, supra note 7, at 720 (same); Ruhl, supra note
7, at 1459.
90. See Anderson, supra note 89, at 395 (describing events during the first Earth Day
on April 22, 1970).
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major federal environmental statutes,91 and the creation of the EPA.92 That being
said, only some of the federal environmental statutes Congress enacted during the
1970s are canonical; others receive relatively meager attention in cases, casebooks,
and law review articles.93
The environmental law canon, as the concept is employed here, is defined and
functions largely descriptively. But the canon has normative elements as well.
Within the environmental community it is largely revered, even when criticized.94
Calls for political action on environmental issues often explicitly invoke the 1970s
as a model and inspiration,95 recognizing both the dramatic material

91. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012)); Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat.
91 (1970) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)); National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2006 & Supp. V 2011)); Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. 2011)); see
also LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 70 (listing eighteen major federal environmental protection
statutes enacted during the 1970s).
92. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970).
93. See, e.g., Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (1972)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901–4918 (2006)). As compared with thousands of
citations in cases and law reviews to the canonical environmental statutes, see supra Figures 2–
3, just thirty-eight cases and ninety-two law review articles since 2000 have mentioned the
Noise Control Act.
Some environmental histories have criticized, to greater and lesser extents, the
narrative of the Environmental Revolution—that is, the idea that the early 1970s represented
the spontaneous “divine conception” of a new field of law. See, e.g., KARL BOYD BROOKS,
BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1945–1970, at 14
(2009). These histories have described the 1970s as a phase in the continued development of a
body of law that long preceded the developments in the 1970s. See, e.g., id. Richard Lazarus
has offered a more middle-ground perspective, emphasizing both the dramatic changes in the
early 1970s and the historical antecedents to those changes. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 9, at
49 (“The environmental statutes and institutions that emerged in the 1970s were of a very
different magnitude than any previously existing regimes for environmental protection, but they
reflected a logical, albeit exponential, outgrowth of decades of legal evolution on closely
related matters.”). Regardless, all of these histories readily acknowledge the significance of the
1970s to the construction of our current system of federal environmental statutes. See, e.g.,
BROOKS, supra, at 15 (“The rate of environmental lawmaking attained its zenith in the early
1970s . . . .”); LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 69 (characterizing the 1970s as “a statutory and
institutional transformation” during which “[s]eemingly every aspect of environmental
protection and natural resource conservation was the subject of comprehensive congressional
legislation”); Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, supra note
32, at 486 (“No matter how environmental law’s historical taxonomy is built, it is plain that the
1970s were ground-shifting.”).
94. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 253 (opining that, despite “slippage,” “regulatory
perversities,” and “serious and persistent socioeconomic and racial inequities,” “environmental
law has been remarkably successful”).
95. See, e.g., David K. Hausman, Kerry Urges Eco-Awareness, HARV. CRIMSON, Apr. 23,
2007,
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2007/4/23/kerry-urges-eco-awareness-sen-john
-kerry/ (reporting speech in which Senator John Kerry “urged a return to the environmental
activism of the early 1970s”).
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accomplishments of the enactments of that period and its strong idealism, which
resonates with many environmentalists. William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have
classified the statutes of the environmental law canon as examples of
“superstatutes,”96 which share three features:
[S]uperstatutes . . . (1) embod[y] a new principle or policy displacing
common law baselines, responsive to important social or economic
challenges facing the country; (2) [are] drafted and enacted after a
process of publicized institutionalized deliberation responsive to the
voices and needs of We the People; and (3) [are] stuck in the public
culture, after a period of implementation and formal confirmation by
Congress after further public discussion.97
Superstatutes, although “subordinate to the Constitution,” become part of “the
fundamental structure and values of American public policy,” “instantiat[ing] both
social norms and legal rules.”98 Thus, according to Eskridge and Ferejohn’s
account of superstatutes, the environmental law canon becomes the focal point not
only of environmental law, but of environmental norms more generally.
This points to a more subtle, and potentially pernicious, normative effect of the
environmental law canon. The predominance of the environmental law canon in the
field, and the strongly similar features the canon exhibits, project an image of
environmental law that is more homogenous and narrow than the field as a whole.
This, in turn, obscures the existence of environmental laws outside of the canon,
and more importantly obscures the possibility of enacting environmental laws that
do not resemble the canon.99

96. WILLIAM N ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 256, 301
(2010) (offering the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Endangered Species Act as
examples of “superstatutes” that comprise a “green constitution”); William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1242–46 (2001) (discussing the
Endangered Species Act as a “superstatute” case study); see also Jim Chen, Legal
Mythmaking in a Time of Mass Extinctions: Reconciling Stories of Origins with Human
Destiny, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 292 (2005) (“The National Environmental Policy
Act of 1970 (‘NEPA’) and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (‘ESA’) head the list of
environmental ‘super-statutes’ whose ‘institutional [and] normative’ impact reaches issues
ordinarily addressed through Constitutional law.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Eskridge &
Ferejohn, supra, at 1216)).
97. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 96, at 26.
98. Id. at 27, 28.
99. An exception to this is the federalism debate over the optimal balance between
national and state environmental regulation, which has received ample attention. See, e.g.,
Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 130, 151 (2005); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the
Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23 (1996); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting:
Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Daniel C. Esty,
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); Scott R. Saleska &
Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check in the

2014]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON

1257

2. Special Cases: ESA and NEPA
Two canonical environmental statutes, the Endangered Species Act (ESA)100
and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),101 present special cases. By any
measure of prominence, the ESA and NEPA qualify as canonical. Commentators
often describe the ESA and NEPA as among the most important environmental
laws.102 Both the ESA and NEPA are among the most litigated environmental
statutes, are among the most cited in law review articles, and appear in the
leading environmental law casebooks.103 Both focus overwhelmingly on
environmental protection.104 Both were enacted in the 1970s.105
But the ESA and NEPA do not entirely follow the dominant pattern for the
environmental law canon, and have some characteristics more associated with
environmental laws outside the canon. Both statutes are often classified as
resource statutes,106 and receive extensive coverage in natural resources law

Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental
Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67 (1996).
100. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
102. The ESA has been called “one of the most potent environmental laws,” J.B. Ruhl &
James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative
State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 59 (2010), and “one of America’s
best-known and most important environmental laws,” Reed D. Benson, Dams, Duties, and
Discretion: Bureau of Reclamation Water Project Operations and the Endangered Species
Act, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9 (2008). NEPA is often called the “Magna Carta” of
environmental law. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, 18 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 201, 209 (2004); Daniel R. Mandelker, The National Environmental Policy Act:
A Review of Its Experience and Problems, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 293, 293 (2010).
103. See supra Part I.B (reporting the frequency that specific environmental statutes
appear in cases, law review articles, and environmental law casebooks).
104. ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (“The purposes of this chapter are to provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered
species and threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the
purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section.”); NEPA
§ 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (“The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which
will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere
and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on
Environmental Quality.”).
105. Congress enacted NEPA in 1970, see National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), and the ESA in 1973, see Endangered Species Act
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884.
106. See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 7, at 669, 682 (referring to NEPA and the ESA,
respectively, as resource statutes); Alyson C. Flournoy, Heather Halter & Christina Storz,
Harnessing the Power of Information to Protect Our Public Natural Resource Legacy, 86 TEX.
L. REV. 1575, 1591–92 (2008) (referring to NEPA as a resource statute); Alyson C. Flournoy,
Preserving Dynamic Systems: Wetlands, Ecology and Law, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 105,
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casebooks.107 Neither statute focuses on pollution, and neither is primarily
administered by EPA. The ESA is primarily administered by resource agencies—
the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s Fisheries Service108—but also places significant implementation
responsibilities on all federal agencies.109 NEPA’s obligations attach to “all
agencies of the Federal Government.”110
Moreover, the nature of NEPA’s and the ESA’s requirements are such that
implementation of those statutes becomes integrated with other, non-environmental
law. NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare and release to the public an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before taking any major action
“significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”111 This obligation
attaches to agency programs as diverse as the Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s funding of a housing development revitalization project,112 the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s designation of a national interest electric
transmission corridor,113 and the Army Corps of Engineers’ construction of a
dam.114 The Endangered Species Act prohibits the “take” of any endangered
species115 and further requires all federal agencies, in consultation with the Fish and
Wildlife Service or the Fisheries Service, to “insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the

107 n.12 (1996) (referring to the ESA as a resource statute); Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds
and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403, 464 (1994)
(referring to NEPA as a resource statute). Although NEPA and the ESA are often classified as
resource statutes, they have distinctive features—for example, primary focus on environmental
protection, broad application across the federal government—that differentiate them from the
other resource statutes and explain their prominence and inclusion in the canon.
107. See, e.g., CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, FEDERICO CHEEVER & BRET C. BIRDSONG, NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 123–84, 759–823 (2005);
JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND
POLICY 258–92, 348–440 (2d ed. 2009).
108. See, e.g., ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (delegating authority to list species as
endangered or threatened to the Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Commerce).
109. See, e.g., ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring “[e]ach Federal agency”
to insure that its actions are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species”).
110. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
111. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Not every federal action necessitates a
full EIS. To determine whether the environmental impacts of a proposed action will be
significant enough to warrant a full EIS, the agency may prepare an Environmental
Assessment. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(b)–(c), 1508.9 (2011). If, based on the Environmental
Assessment, the agency concludes that the proposed action will not significantly impact the
environment, it will issue a Finding of No Significant Impact in lieu of an EIS. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.13 (2011). See generally Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756–58
(2004) (providing an overview of EISs, Environmental Assessments, and Findings of No
Significant Impact).
112. Coliseum Square Ass’n v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 237–38 (5th Cir. 2006).
113. Cal. Wilderness Coal v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1096–98 (9th Cir. 2011).
114. See Marsh v. Ore. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 364–67 (1989).
115. ESA § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012).
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destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat of such species.”116 These
requirements, like NEPA, also apply to diverse circumstances, such as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) provision of federal flood
insurance,117 the Army’s ongoing operation of a military base,118 and the
Department of Energy’s grant of an easement across its property for construction
and use of a private mining road.119
Because NEPA and the ESA are for the most part implemented by agencies that
do not specialize in environmental law, and because NEPA and the ESA’s
requirements apply to activities not necessarily undertaken as part of environmental
programs, both statutes are essentially incorporated into non-environmental
programs. For example, the application of the ESA’s “take” and “jeopardy”
provisions to FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program essentially incorporates
the ESA provisions into the federal flood insurance program.120 The integration of
NEPA and ESA implementation with non-environmental programs distinguishes
NEPA and the ESA from other statutes in the environmental canon, which are
administered by EPA as part of its set of environmental statutes. In fact, the
integration of NEPA and ESA implementation with non-environmental programs
resembles a key feature of some noncanonical environmental statutes—a category I
call embedded environmental laws—which Part II examines in detail.
As statutes that receive widespread attention from practitioners and academics,
but that have some distinctive features more associated with environmental laws
outside of the canon than within it, the ESA and NEPA somewhat muddy the
distinction between canonical and noncanonical environmental law. But the ESA’s
and NEPA’s unusual, noncanonical features also make them potentially useful
vehicles for understanding how the distinctive features of noncanonical
environmental law operate.121 Moreover, the noncanonical characteristics of NEPA
and the ESA enable both statutes to work synergistically in support of noncanonical
environmental provisions.122
3. Subcanonical Environmental Law
Outside of the core environmental law canon lie other sets of environmental
laws that have some, but not all, of the features of canonical environmental law and
a correspondingly diminished prominence in the field—well below the importance
of the statutes in the canon, but still more important than other categories of
noncanonical environmental law. Some of these subcanonical environmental laws
have important links with canonical environmental laws.
Resource Statutes. Outside of the canon of federal statutes enacted primarily to
protect the natural environment, the set of laws most closely associated with

116. ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
117. See Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1141–44 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that
the ESA § 7 applies to FEMA’s administration of the National Flood Insurance Program).
118. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (D. Ariz. 2002).
119. Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1190 (D. Colo. 2002).
120. See Fla. Key Deer, 522 F.3d at 1141–44.
121. See infra Part II.
122. See infra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
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environmental law are the federal natural resource statutes. They receive significant
attention in case law, in law school curricula, and in legal scholarship—although to
a lesser extent than the pollution statutes and with a disproportionate emphasis in
the West.123 Resource statutes share several characteristics that distinguish them
from statutes in the environmental law canon. Resource statutes are mixed-motive
environmental laws that, although they include a goal of conserving and preserving
elements of the natural environment,124 also intentionally facilitate the exploitation
of natural resources.125 Their subject matter is natural resources rather than
pollution, and they are administered by resource agencies rather than by EPA.126
Resource agencies are staffed and operate very differently than EPA, and even
operate under different constitutional authority.127
Other Federal Pollution Statutes. Not all federal pollution statutes fall within
the environmental law canon. EPA administers other statutes lacking the
prominence of the major pollution statutes that comprise the environmental law
canon. Some of these EPA statutes, such as the Safe Drinking Water Act,128 have
the requisite features of the statutes in the canon but are much smaller programs by

123. In fact, the importance of publicly owned natural resources in rural areas of the West
may give the resource statutes more prominence than the canonical pollution statutes in such
areas.
124. See, e.g., Federal Lands Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) § 202(c)(3),
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(3) (2006) (instructing the Secretary of the Interior, in the management
of public lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management, to “give priority to the
designation and protection of areas of critical environmental concern”). Clean Water Act
§ 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006), which regulates the placement of dredge and fill material in
waters of the United States, presents an interesting question of classification. Although the
Clean Water Act overall is a canonical pollution statute, the dredge-and-fill program under
section 404 is often viewed instead as a wetlands protection provision more associated with
natural resources law. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. GABA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 88 (4th ed. 2009)
(observing that section 404 “is typically not addressed in detail in environmental law
casebooks”); Oliver A. Houck, Retaking the Exam: How Environmental Law Failed New
Orleans and the Gulf Coast South and How It Might Yet Succeed, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1059,
1070 (2007) (“Originally seen as a pollution control program, section 404 quickly became a
wetlands-development control program as well . . . .”).
125. See, e.g., FLPMA § 202(c)(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1) (instructing the Secretary of
the Interior, in the management of the same public lands, to “observe the principles of
multiple use and sustained yield,” which are defined to include the potential extraction of
timber and minerals); see also LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 178 (“Natural resources laws
historically equated the public interest with the economic exploitation and development of
natural resources, although resource conservation and ‘public trust doctrine’ principles had
emerged as a significant counterweight by the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries . . . .”).
126. See, e.g., National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1–18f-3 (2012)
(administered by the National Park Service); National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614 (administered by the Forest Service); Federal Lands Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (administered
by the Bureau of Land Management).
127. EPA statutes operate largely under the authority of the Commerce Clause; natural
resource statutes operate largely under the authority of the Property Clause.
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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virtue of their narrower scope. Others aim at somewhat different objectives. The
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)129 and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),130 for example, address human health and environmental
hazards throughout the life cycle of a substance rather than just when a substance is
released into the environment. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act (EPCRA or EPCRTKA)131 addresses emergency planning and reporting
of inventories and releases of hazardous chemicals.
State Law Analogues. Although the environmental law canon is decidedly
federal—for example, no major environmental law casebook examines state
environmental laws in detail—some state environmental statutes are functionally
close to the canon. State environmental statutes are often modeled on federal
environmental statutes.132 Many times this modeling arises because federal
environmental statutes, through what is known as cooperative federalism or
“delegated program federalism,”133 allow state environmental programs to
implement federal statutes.134 To some extent, this relationship emphasizes and
inflates the primacy of federal environmental law, because state environmental
laws developed under cooperative federalism usually closely resemble the federal
environmental laws they implement.135 But the role of states in cooperative
federalism regimes also gives states a degree of power in setting federal policy,
because EPA sometimes lacks the capacity to supersede state programs and
accordingly must defer to state programs even when they diverge from the
supposedly minimum federal standard.136 Even state statutes modeled on federal
statutes may give states increased authority that federal agencies lack under their
statutes. Washington’s cleanup statute, for example, includes petroleum and

129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (2012).
130. 7 U.S.C. §§136–136y (2012).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2006).
132. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6301–6309 (2011) (adopting hazardous waste
management provisions similar to RCRA); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11–/13.7 (West
2011 & Supp. 2013) (adopting water pollution provisions similar to the Clean Water Act and
Safe Drinking Water Act).
133. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1276 (2009) (“Since the 1970s, states have implemented and enforced
most of the United States’s major environmental statutes.”); William W. Buzbee,
Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1547, 1565 (2007) (noting that federal environmental statutes often allow state
governments to assume implementation and enforcement of a program if state laws are at
least as stringent as federal requirements).
134. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006) (allowing EPA to
authorize state water pollution discharge permit programs implementing the Federal Clean
Water Act).
135. Compare, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-5301.01 (LexisNexis 2008) (prohibiting
the use of lead pipes, plumbing fixtures, solder, or flux in public water systems or plumbing
that provides water for human consumption), with Safe Drinking Water Act § 1417(a)(1)(A),
42 U.S.C. § 300g-6(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (same).
136. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 133, at 1276–77 (citing John P. Dwyer,
The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995)).
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petroleum products that CERCLA specifically excludes.137 Pennsylvania’s Clean
Streams Law similarly covers more water bodies than the Federal Clean Water
Act.138
Common Law. The common law also occupies a special place in environmental
law, in some ways like certain state environmental laws—outside the canon but
also closely intertwined with it. Common law doctrines that address environmental
problems share few features in common with canonical environmental laws.
Common law has a primarily remedial purpose, whereas environmental regulation
has a regulatory purpose.139 Common law doctrines employ different regulatory
mechanisms than statutes; common law imposes liability for the harm conduct
causes, whereas statutes generally prohibit certain conduct, without a showing of
individualized harm. Common law doctrines are judge-made and administered by
courts through largely private litigation; statutes are enacted by legislatures and
administered by administrative agencies. Common law doctrines are primarily
state, rather than federal, law. The differences between environmental statutes and
common law are in part quite deliberate. Modern environmental statutes were
enacted in part because of the perceived inadequacy of common law doctrines to
protect the environment.140 But common law doctrines are also not entirely separate
from environmental statutes—for example, courts often construe undefined
statutory terms according to their meaning in the common law,141 and statutory
requirements may help to define common law liability.142
International Environmental Treaties. International environmental treaties lie at
the intersection of the fields of environmental law and international law and form
the foundation of international environmental law, a subfield of both fields. Some
treaties have generated implementing legislation that shows up in the
environmental law canon, such as the provisions of the Clean Air Act that
implement the Montreal Protocol.143

137. Compare CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2006) (stating that hazardous
substance “does not include petroleum”), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105D.020(10)(d)
(West 2011) (defining hazardous substance to include “[p]etroleum or petroleum products”).
138. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2013) (tying the definition of “waters of the United
States” covered by the Clean Water Act to the waters’ effect on foreign and interstate
commerce), with 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 691.1 (West 2003) (defining “Waters of the
Commonwealth” covered by the Clean Streams Law “to include any and all . . . bodies or
channels of conveyance of surface and underground water, or parts thereof, whether natural
or artificial, within or on the boundaries of this Commonwealth”).
139. PLATER ET AL., supra note 85, at 74.
140. See Percival, supra note 7, at 160 (noting that the major environmental statutes
enacted in the 1970s were in part “adopted in response to perceived inadequacies of the
common law”).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 277 F.3d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 2001) (construing
the Lacey Act by inquiring “whether Congress used terms which have a specific commonlaw meaning”).
142. See, e.g., Gearhardt v. Am. Reinforced Paper Co., 244 F.2d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 1957)
(affirming judgment for plaintiff where defendant negligently caused a fire that damaged
plaintiff’s property in violation of Illinois state law).
143. See Clean Air Act §§ 601–618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671–7671q (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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4. Noncanonical Environmental Law
Outside of the categories of canonical and subcanonical environmental laws,
there are other environmental laws that lie clearly apart from the canon of the field,
both in terms of their relative obscurity within environmental law and differences
in their characteristic features.
Some of these categories of noncanonical environmental law exhibit multiple
features that separate them from the environmental law canon. For example, state
natural resources statutes,144 which tend to receive meager attention, are neither
pollution statutes nor federal laws. Noncanonical environmental law also includes
private law that addresses environmental concerns, such as a lease term that seeks
to prevent the lessee from causing environmental contamination on the lessor’s
property.145
Other categories of noncanonical environmental law, such as local land use law,
are recognized independent legal fields. These related fields overlap incompletely
with environmental law, in that some but not all of the laws within the field address
environmental concerns. Such related fields have their own independent casebooks,
scholarship, and doctrine.146 Energy law provides an interesting example of a
related field that may once have fit within the category of noncanonical
environmental law, or perhaps not environmental law at all, but has arguably
ascended to at least the category of subcanonical environmental law by virtue of
energy law’s increasing focus on environmental concerns and the increased
appreciation of its important relationship to environmental issues such as air
pollution and climate change.
Apart from related legal fields, other noncanonical environmental laws take the
form of environmental provisions contained within a statute not primarily aimed at
regulating environmental impacts, or environmental statutes contained within a
larger non-environmental program. I collectively refer to these categories as
embedded environmental law, reflecting the incorporation of environmental
provisions or statutes into broader non-environmental statutes or programs.147

144. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 9-13-1 to -274 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2012) state-owned
forests); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 49-29-10 to -230 (2008 & Supp. 2012) (state scenic rivers).
145. See, e.g., Heather Hughes, Securitization and Suburbia, 90 OR. L. REV. 359, 369
n.23 (2011) (contending that “private ordering [is] central to the concerns of environmental
law”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029,
2033 (2005) (arguing that “second-order agreements” among private actors create incentives
that affect the implementation of public law regulation).
146. See, e.g., ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSÉ A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATION FOR
REVENUE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS (1993); DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, CAROL NECOLE BROWN, STUART MECK, DWIGHT H. MERRIAM, PETER W.
SALSICH, JR., NANCY E. STROUD & JULIE A. TAPPENDORF, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND
DEVELOPMENT (8th ed. 2011).
147. Embedded environmental laws differ from legal fields or concepts that merely
overlap in application with environmental law. Bankruptcy law, for example, often applies in
circumstances in which environmental law also applies. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs.
v. Jensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993) (addressing whether claim against business owners
for costs of cleanup of hazardous waste at their former business property was discharged in
their bankruptcy); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984)
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Embedded environmental law—including its distinctive features and importance to
the broader project of environmental law—is the focus of Part II.
II. EMBEDDED ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Embedded environmental laws, a subspecies of noncanonical environmental
law, are contained within a statute or program that is not primarily aimed at
regulating environmental impacts and usually are administered by an agency that
does not specialize in environmental issues. Essentially, embedded environmental
laws are environmental laws organized with other, non-environmental laws.
Embedded environmental laws thus lie within overlapping legal fields—both
environmental law and whatever field they are embedded within.
Embedded environmental laws have heretofore been overlooked, both
individually and collectively, as a category of functionally distinct environmental
law. To a certain extent their obscurity is understandable. Embedded environmental
laws do not compare to the environmental law canon in terms of size or
prominence; they do not belong in the canon. Embedded environmental laws are
hidden away in the law generally, isolated both substantively and institutionally
from other environmental laws. Many of them are relatively minor provisions with
uncertain environmental impacts or even an uncertain relationship to environmental
concerns. But it is a mistake to ignore embedded environmental laws, in part
precisely because they differ so much from the environmental law canon, for their
differences create the basis for an alternative model of environmental lawmaking.
Embedded environmental laws have the potential to play an increasing and
constructive role in the future of environmental law.
This Part examines embedded environmental laws as a discrete and largely
ignored category of environmental law. Part II.A identifies four different types of
embedded environmental laws, adding clarity to the definition of the category. Part
II.B then explores how the features identified in Part I.C, which differentiate among
environmental laws, are manifested in embedded environmental law. Part II.C
examines the implications of those features for how embedded environmental laws
function as compared with the environmental law canon. Finally, Part II.D argues
that embedded environmental law is an alternative and parallel system that can
complement and substitute for canonical environmental law, helping environmental
law to address some of its major challenges.
A. Types
Because statutes are not necessarily codified by the same method of
organization as they are enacted, environmental laws can be embedded at creation
only, at implementation only, or at both creation and implementation:
(addressing whether Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay precluded state agency from
enforcing injunction against bankruptcy debtor to correct violations of various state
environmental protection statutes). This overlap poses interesting and important questions
for the application of both legal fields, see, e.g., Jason S. Brookner, Environmental Claims in
Bankruptcy: An Overview, 112 BANKING L.J. 124 (1995); Stanley M. Spracker & James D.
Barnette, The Treatment of Environmental Matters in Bankruptcy Cases, 11 BANKR. DEV. J.
85 (1995), but does not by itself transform bankruptcy laws into environmental laws.
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•

An environmental law is embedded only at creation if it is enacted as part
of a non-environmental statute but administered with an environmental
statute or program. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005,148 which
overall was not an environmental law, included provisions amending the
Clean Air Act with respect to regulation of renewable fuels.149

•

An environmental law is embedded only at implementation if it is enacted
as part of an environmental statute but administered with a nonenvironmental statute or program. For example, the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990150 amended the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970151 to require the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to
issue “a chemical process safety standard designed to protect employees
from hazards associated with accidental releases of highly hazardous
chemicals in the workplace.”152

•

An environmental law is embedded at both creation and implementation if
it is enacted as part of a non-environmental statute and codified and
administered with a non-environmental statute or program. For example,
section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, which
restricts the use of certain parklands and historic areas for federal
transportation projects, was enacted and is codified as part of the
Department of Transportation’s enabling statute.153

This Part’s examination of embedded environmental laws will focus on those
embedded at both creation and implementation, because those laws most
thoroughly exhibit the distinctive characteristics of embedded environmental laws
and stand in sharpest contrast with canonical environmental statutes. Its
observations and conclusions about laws embedded at both creation and
implementation apply in part, however, to the functioning of environmental laws
embedded only at creation (and not implementation) or only at implementation.
Such partially embedded environmental laws function as a hybrid of characteristics
associated with conventional environmental laws and characteristics associated
with fully embedded environmental laws. For example, take the Energy Policy Act
of 2005’s amendments to the Clean Air Act,154 embedded at creation but not

148. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.
149. Id. § 1501, 119 Stat. at 1067–76 (amending Clean Air Act § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545).
150. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.
151. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
152. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 304(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655.
153. Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 303 (2006)); see also, e.g., Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (AAIA), 49 U.S.C. §
47106(c)(1)(B) (2006) (requiring Federal Aviation Administration to take “every reasonable step”
to avoid approving airport runway development projects that will have “a significant adverse
effect on natural resources”); Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, §
3(b), 100 Stat. 1243, 1243–44 (amending Federal Power Act § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1), to
add “the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife (including related
spawning grounds and habitat)” to the required elements of any hydropower licenses approved by
the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission)).
154. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1501, 119 Stat. at 1067–76 (amending Clean Air Act
§ 211).
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implementation: enacting the amendments as part of an energy bill, rather than as
part of a statute focused on the Clean Air Act, likely affected the politics of the
legislation.155 On the other hand, once EPA incorporated the amendments into the
Agency’s ongoing Clean Air Act programs, the amendments essentially became
part of the environmental law canon. Depending on the objectives and the
circumstances, hybridity may pose an advantage or a disadvantage.
B. Features
Embedded environmental laws have distinctive features in common that help
both to define the category and to distinguish it from other environmental laws.
Embedded environmental laws are thus more than just examples of environmental
laws outside of the canon; they are their own coherent category.
Implementing Institution. Whereas most statutes within the environmental law
canon are administered by EPA, and many of the subcanonical resource statutes are
administered by resource agencies with significant environmental experience and
expertise, embedded environmental laws are often administered by agencies that
are not primarily environmental, such as the Internal Revenue Service’s
administration of an excise tax on ozone-depleting substances,156 the Department of
Transportation’s administration of section 4(f) of its organic act,157 or the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission’s administration of section 10(a) of the Federal
Power Act, requiring hydropower licenses to provide “adequate protection,
mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife.”158
Role of Environmental Protection. As one gets further away from the
environmental law canon, the role of the environment in environmental laws tends
to get murkier and less prominent. The environment, to the extent it is a focus at all,
lacks the claims of primacy that it enjoys in the environmental law canon. For
example, the excise tax on ozone-depleting substances was enacted both to protect
the stratospheric ozone layer and to raise revenue.159 The Plant Protection Act,160
which aims to control the spread of plant pests and noxious weeds, mentions
environmental concerns among its statutory objectives but seems primarily oriented
toward protecting the agriculture sector.161 Similarly, the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act,162 among its various provisions, states six requirements for tribal
gaming ordinances for class II gaming under the statute; one of those six
requirements provides that the gaming must be “conducted in a manner which
adequately protects the environment and the public health and safety.”163 This

155. See infra Part II.C.3 (examining the political characteristics of embedded
environmental laws).
156. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681–4682 (2006).
157. Department of Transportation Act § 4(f), 80 Stat. at 934 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 303).
158. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (2012).
159. See infra note 223 (describing the history of the tax).
160. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786 (2012).
161. See id. § 7701 (setting forth congressional findings).
162. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2006).
163. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(E).
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isolated environmental provision is buried within a statute focused generally on
gaming’s ability to promote tribal economic development and concerns about
potentially corrupting influences such as organized crime.164 Indeed, for many
embedded environmental laws, even the environmental-ness of the law at all is
unclear.165
Subject Matter and Media. Consistent with the predominance of the
environmental law canon, when Congress addresses an environmental problem
involving a subject matter or media similar to existing canonical environmental
law, Congress tends to utilize the environmental law canon, using existing
regulatory mechanisms implemented by agencies specializing in environmental
regulation. Thus, for example, Congress addressed anthropogenic depletion of the
stratospheric ozone through the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which
directed EPA to regulate ozone-depleting substances under the Clean Air Act.166
Congress tends to enact embedded environmental laws, on the other hand, to
address more novel environmental problems—for example, the invasive plant
species regulated under the Plant Protection Act, airport noise regulated under the
Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979,167 or marketing of organically
produced products regulated under the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990.168
Breadth. Given their relative obscurity, it is not surprising that embedded
environmental laws are smaller and narrower programs than the canonical
environmental statutes. One of the ways in which embedded environmental laws
are narrow, however, has important functional implications: many embedded
environmental laws target a specific sector—for example, environmental provisions
of the Food Security Act of 1985,169 which targets agriculture; section 10(a) of the
Federal Power Act, which targets hydropower;170 and section 4(f) of the
Department of Transportation Act, which targets transportation.171 Sector-specific
environmental laws are more readily embedded into other non-environmental
programs because many non-environmental government programs are sector
specific and are administered by sector-specific institutions such as the Department
of Agriculture, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Department of
Transportation.

164. See, e.g., id. § 2702.
165. See infra Part III.C.
166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671–7671q (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
167. Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94 Stat. 50 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 47501–
47510 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013)).
168. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6522 (2012).
169. Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354. The Food Security Act (FSA) contains two
environmental provisions—known as Sodbuster, FSA §§ 1211–1213, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811–
3813 (2012), and Swampbuster, FSA §§ 1221–1223, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821–3823—that
condition farmers’ eligibility for many federal farm program benefits on minimum standards
of protection for certain environmentally sensitive lands. Sodbuster denies eligibility to
farmers who convert highly erodible land to crop production without an approved soil
conservation system. 16 U.S.C. § 3811. Swampbuster denies eligibility to farmers who
convert a wetland to crop production. 16 U.S.C. § 3821.
170. 16 U.S.C. § 803.
171. 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).
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Despite these patterns, to a significant extent a defining characteristic of
embedded environmental laws is their diversity of features. Embedded
environmental laws are not constrained by the comparatively homogenous model
of the environmental law canon. In addition to addressing different types of subject
matter and media, with different roles for environmental protection, and
administered by different agencies than the environmental law canon, embedded
environmental laws employ a broader variety of regulatory mechanisms, including
taxes,172 incentives,173 and planning requirements,174 as well as more conventional
regulation.175
C. Implications
Canonical environmental law is integrated with other environmental law. For
example, a federal regulation restricting air pollutant emissions from a power
plant176 is integrated with other federal air pollution regulation—administered by
the same subagency (EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation), as part of the same
statutory program (Clean Air Act). Canonical environmental law is segregated,

172. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681–4682 (2006).
173. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811–3813.
174. 49 U.S.C. § 303.
175. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5128 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). As previously mentioned, see
supra Part I.B.2, there are interesting parallels between the implementation of NEPA and the
ESA and the implementation of embedded environmental laws. Like the administration of
embedded environmental laws, NEPA analyses and ESA consultations are often undertaken
by agencies that are not environmental specialists. See, e.g., Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522
F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying section 7 of the ESA to Federal Emergency
Management Agency); Am. Bird Conservancy, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.3d 1027, 1029 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (per curiam) (applying NEPA to Federal Communications Commission); Soc’y Hill
Towers Owners’ Ass’n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying NEPA to
Department of Housing and Urban Development). Agencies apply NEPA and the ESA in
conjunction with their administration of other non-environmental statutes, see, e.g., Fla. Key
Deer, 522 F.3d at 1141–44 (applying section 7 of the ESA to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency’s implementation of the National Flood Insurance Act); Am. Bird
Conservancy, 516 F.3d at 1032–34 (applying NEPA to Federal Communications
Commission implementation of the Communications Act of 1934); Soc’y Hill Towers
Owners’ Ass’n, 210 F.3d at 173 (applying NEPA to Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s implementation of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974),
just as agencies often apply embedded environmental laws in conjunction with their
administration of broader non-environmental programs. For example, the Department of
Transportation implements section 4(f)’s environmental requirements in conjunction with its
broader administration of transportation funding under the Department of Transportation
Act, see, e.g., Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 42 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994)
(per curiam), and the Department of Agriculture implements Swampbuster’s environmental
requirements in conjunction with its broader administration of farm subsidy programs, see,
e.g., Gunn v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 118 F.3d 1233 (8th Cir. 1997). In both types of situations,
the presence of the environmental law—NEPA, the ESA, or an embedded environmental
statute—integrates environmental concerns with other policy objectives.
176. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.40Da–.52Da (2013) (setting forth Standards of
Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units).
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however, from non-environmental law—the same federal regulation restricting air
pollutant emissions from a power plant is not integrated, for example, with labor
standards177 that apply to the power plant.
Embedded environmental law, on the other hand, is segregated from
environmental law but integrated with some body of non-environmental law with
which it shares other attributes. For example, section 4(f) is integrated with
transportation programs in the Department of Transportation but segregated from
programs that apply to parklands.178
Comparing embedded environmental laws and the environmental law canon
thus implicates questions about how to organize the law—in essence, comparing
how a particular environmental provision would function as part of a broader
environmental statute administered by an agency specializing in environmental
policy, with how it would function as part of a program focused on the regulated
activity.179 One way to think about how law should be organized in its enactment
and administration is in terms of complementarities of function, which can be used
to decide whether functions should be coordinated or administered
independently.180 Where functions are complementary, there are likely to be
benefits from coordinating those functions.181 Embedded environmental law offers
the possibility that, in a particular situation, there may be greater complementarity
of function among certain environmental and non-environmental provisions that
govern the same activity than among environmental provisions that govern a
particular type of environmental harm.
Lawmakers producing environmental law choose—whether deliberately or
inadvertently—what form the law should take. In choosing whether to address an
environmental problem by adding a new provision modeled on the environmental

177. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.1–.60 (2013) (regulating wage payments under the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938).
178. In this respect, NEPA and the ESA operate differently than other statutes in the
environmental law canon. See supra Part I.B.2. Because much of the responsibility for
implementing NEPA and, albeit to a lesser extent, the ESA rests with non-environmental
agencies implementing what are otherwise non-environmental programs, see supra notes
109–10 and accompanying text, the administration of NEPA and the ESA resembles the
administration of an embedded environmental law. When NEPA requires the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to prepare an Environmental Assessment before
approving a housing redevelopment project, for example, it is as if NEPA has been
embedded in HUD’s housing program. This is not just a question of overlapping application,
as it would be with a Clean Water Act requirement that applied to the housing project.
NEPA integrates into HUD’s program, actually becoming part of the Agency’s process for
approving the housing project.
179. Cf. Eric Biber, The More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of
Administrative Law Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78, 79 (2012), http://
www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvol125_biber.pdf (“A key question is whether you
want to manage the externality-causing activity separately from the externality, or together.”).
180. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 988–97 (2004).
181. Id. Assessing functional complementarity with any specificity, however, can be very
difficult. Id. at 997.

1270

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:1239

law canon or by enacting a new embedded environmental provision, lawmakers
should carefully consider the implications of the differences between the two.
The remainder of this Subpart compares how the differences in the features of
canonical and embedded environmental laws affect the ways in which they function
legally, institutionally, and politically. The purpose of this functional comparison is
not to claim that embedded environmental law is categorically superior to canonical
environmental law, or vice versa. Rather, the specific context in which a law
applies determines whether a particular functional characteristic poses an advantage
or disadvantage.
1. Legal Functions
Ideally, laws would exhibit an attribute of comprehensive and complete
coherence—that is, perfect coherence across all possible axes of comparison. A
federal statute regulating air pollutant emissions from coal-fired power plants, for
example, ideally would be entirely coherent with other federal air pollution
regulation, with other federal environmental regulation, with other federal nonenvironmental regulation of power plants and of the electricity they generate, and
with state and local environmental and non-environmental regulation of power
plants. Without such coherence, laws can work inefficiently, operate at crosspurposes, or even conflict.
Purposeful coherence, however, is costly to attain. It requires coordination—
potentially, coordination at every stage of the legal process: during the enactment
of the legislation, during the agency proceedings to implement the legislation, and
during the enforcement process. Comprehensive and complete coherence across the
entire web of interrelated laws is infeasible. Realistically, then, coherence will be
limited at best, and lawmakers face a tradeoff in deciding what coherence to
prioritize.
The way the law is organized increases the salience of certain of its
characteristics, thereby facilitating the coherence of laws that share those
characteristics. A massive environmental statute such as the Clean Air Act may be
sprawling, complex, and far from comprehensively coherent, but it exhibits certain
discernible internal patterns. Accordingly, a regulatory provision within the Clean
Air Act is more likely to be coherent with other provisions of the Act than with a
provision of another statute. Similarly, a provision of a Farm Bill is more likely to
be coherent with another provision of the Farm Bill than with the Clean Water Act.
The relative merit of creating a new environmental provision as part of an
environmental statute or by embedding it in a non-environmental statute thus
depends in significant part on whether greater value arises from coherence with
other environmental laws or coherence with other non-environmental laws that
address the same conduct. Canonical environmental law—environmental law
organized with other environmental law—is more likely to produce internal
coherence and consistency within the field of environmental law. Embedded
environmental law—environmental law organized with other non-environmental
law—is more likely to generate coherence and consistency in the law of the field in
which it is embedded.
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The benefits of coherence, moreover, likely increase as the concentration of
regulation in the sector increases.182 Thus, in ascertaining whether a new
environmental policy would function better if enacted within existing
environmental programs (canonical environmental law) or with other nonenvironmental programs targeting the same industry (embedded environmental
law), policymakers should compare the relative intensity of regulation in each
sphere, all else equal favoring placement of the new law in the more intense sphere,
at what one might call the regulatory center of gravity.
Thus, it makes sense to regulate corporate disclosure of environmental liabilities
as part of a program regulating corporate disclosures rather than as part of a
program focusing on environmental liabilities.183 Existing securities laws
intensively regulate other, non–environmentally related corporate disclosures.184
On the other hand, although environmental regulatory programs such as CERCLA
create environmental liabilities, they do not generally regulate the disclosure of
such liabilities. The center of regulatory gravity for corporate disclosure of
environmental liability, and accordingly the likely greatest benefit from coherence,
is located within the programs regulating corporate disclosures (embedded
environmental law) rather than within environmental regulatory programs
(canonical environmental law).
In weighing the relative merits of organizing new environmental law within
existing environmental programs or separate from those existing programs, the
relative conduciveness of each form to innovation may be an important
consideration. In particular, coherence with existing law can be a drag on
innovation. By its very nature, coherence pushes in the direction of conformity
rather than diversity. The framework of existing statutes therefore constrains
options for regulatory innovation within those programs.185 Even statutory
amendments usually accomplish only incremental change.186 Thus, addressing an
environmental problem by making changes within the environmental law canon
will likely result in a new environmental law that looks more like existing
environmental law than if the problem is addressed by enacting a new provision of
embedded environmental law, separate from the extant canon. Embedded
environmental law, less burdened by the need to conform to existing environmental

182. On the other hand, the costs of coordination also substantially increase as the
intensity of regulation increases—the more there is to coordinate, the more difficult it is to
coordinate.
183. See, e.g., Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75
Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241). See generally
John W. Bagby, Paula C. Murray & Eric T. Andrews, How Green Was My Balance Sheet?:
Corporate Liability and Environmental Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 225 (1995).
184. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2013).
185. See Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The
Case for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457, 480 (1996) (“[A] truly new
regulatory system cannot be implemented within the existing legal framework . . . .”).
186. Even the massive and dramatic Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, which significantly revamped the Clean Air Act and were many
times longer than the original Clean Air Act of 1970, for the most part added new elements
to existing programs and did not replace the existing statutory programs.
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programs, provides a structure more conducive to experimentation and policy
innovation than canonical environmental statutes.
Another important consideration is the organization of the field into which the
environmental provision is embedded. Just as environmental law has its own
internal organization,187 other fields do as well, probably including some
hierarchical order of prominence. The effectiveness of an environmental provision
embedded into another field likely depends on how the environmental provision
integrates with the field. To the extent the other field has canonical statutes with
heightened salience within that field, and concomitant higher levels of attention and
resources, an environmental provision embedded within one of those canonical
statutes would likely be more efficacious than if it were embedded in a less
prominent statute. The effects of the Swampbuster provision of the Food Security
Act and of section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act are enhanced, for
example, because the Food Security Act—a Farm Bill—and the Department of
Transportation Act are canonical within their respective fields of agricultural law
and transportation law. On the other hand, precisely because of the salience of a
canonical statute within its field, it may be politically more difficult to embed an
environmental provision in a canonical statute of another field than in a statute that
is more obscure to the field.
2. Institutional Functions
Embedded environmental law also differs fundamentally from the
environmental law canon because the agencies that administer embedded
environmental laws differ from EPA. EPA is the acknowledged environmental
expert and specialist in the Executive Branch. The Agency’s mission focuses on
environmental protection.188 Even for programs that Congress delegates to another
agency, as to issues that implicate environmental concerns, Congress often directs
the implementing agency to coordinate with EPA.189 EPA has accumulated a staff
of thousands of environmental experts with which no other federal agency can
compete.190
Embedded environmental law thus poses institutional challenges, because it puts
environmental lawmaking in the hands of administrative agencies that lack
experience and expertise—and perhaps motivation as well—in addressing
environmental protection. For many agencies, environmental protection is a
secondary goal, and is potentially perceived to be at odds with the agency’s other,

187. See supra Part I.B.
188. Our Mission and What We Do, supra note 61 (“The mission of EPA is to protect
human health and the environment.”).
189. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 349 (2006) (directing the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to consult with EPA after it has issued a new drinking water regulation under the
Safe Drinking Water Act regarding whether to promulgate regulations applying the EPA
regulation to bottled drinking water).
190. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA, REP. NO. 11-P-0136, EPA NEEDS BETTER
AGENCY-WIDE CONTROLS OVER STAFF RESOURCES 1 (2011) (reporting that the Agency
employed somewhat over 18,000 people during fiscal years 2006–2010).
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primary goals.191 Based on these factors, it might seem that delegating an
environmental program to an agency other than EPA would invariably pose a
disadvantage to the effectiveness of the program.
But EPA is far from perfect. It is already overburdened with existing statutory
mandates.192 It is highly bureaucratic in ways that may impair its ability to respond
with speed and agility to new policy challenges.193 Violent swings of the political
pendulum have left the agency with what William Ruckelshaus, its first
Administrator, has called “battered agency syndrome.”194 EPA also has
traditionally concentrated on pollution and public health; the agency may have less
institutional advantage in addressing environmental problems that lie outside of
these realms.
Moreover, despite their relative lack of expertise on environmental issues, nonenvironmental agencies may better understand the non-environmental dimensions
of a problem. Drawing again on the example of corporate disclosures of
environmental liabilities,195 the SEC may not have EPA’s deep expertise on issues
of environmental liability, but it has much stronger experience than EPA on issues
of corporate disclosure, and that expertise may be more relevant than
environmental expertise to the overall success of corporate disclosures of
environmental liabilities.
Other agencies also may be more willing and able to depart from the
environmental law canon’s paradigm that dominates EPA. Agencies are notorious
for their predilection toward the status quo and against dramatic change.196
Delegating a new environmental program to EPA, an agency with an existing
heavy environmental docket, is thus likely to result in a new program that strongly
resembles existing EPA programs. Delegating a new environmental program to an
agency such as the Department of Agriculture, which focuses far less on
environmental regulation, puts the agency in a position of writing policy on a
relatively cleaner slate. At the very least, the institutional tendencies of a nonenvironmental agency such as the Department of Agriculture are likely to be based
on its existing programs that differ significantly from the environmental law canon.
The Swampbuster provision of the Food Security Act, for example, has features

191. See Todd S. Aagaard, A Functional Approach to Risks and Uncertainties Under
NEPA, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 87, 115 (2012); cf. Eric Biber, Too Many Things to
Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 6–30 (2009) (describing the tendency of multiple-goal agencies to focus on certain
primary goals at the expense of secondary goals).
192. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Integration & Biocomplexity, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1191,
1233 (2001) (referring to EPA Administrator as “harassed and overburdened”); William D.
Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 25, 26 (“Any senior
EPA official will tell you that the agency has the resources to do not much more than ten
percent of the things Congress has charged it to do.”).
193. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. 31174 (Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Sen. Baucus)
(criticizing “EPA’s bloated bureaucratic process”).
194. Ruckelshaus, supra note 192, at 25.
195. See supra notes 183–84 and accompanying text.
196. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2263
(2001) (noting bureaucracies’ tendency toward “inertia and torpor”).
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consistent with existing agriculture programs built around subsidy programs but
functions quite differently from the Clean Water Act’s wetlands program.197
The prospect of dispersing environmental programs across agencies throughout
the federal government may induce concerns of fragmentation, which “can yield
conflicting policies that frustrate each other, or duplicative policies that waste effort
. . . [or] gaps [that are] unaddressed.”198 But all regulation is fragmented across
some dimensions, and so delegating all federal regulatory authority over
environmental issues to EPA would fragment environmental regulations from other
non-environmental regulations that apply to the same industry. Even environmental
programs are generally fragmented by environmental media.
The question, then, is not whether to fragment regulatory programs—they must
be fragmented—but rather which shared features to organize together and which to
fragment. Fragmenting across some dimensions—for example, allocating
regulatory authority over environmental problems across multiple agencies—may
allow integrating others, such as coordinated environmental and non-environmental
regulation of a particular sector.
In sum, the question of whether an environmental or non-environmental agency
would most effectively administer an environmental provision does not as clearly
favor the environmental agency as one might initially assume. Environmental
agencies have the advantage of environmental expertise and focus, but
non-environmental agencies offer their own advantages. In particular, the
organization of embedded environmental laws199 and their institutional setting200
may work in combination to free embedded environmental laws from the
constraints of existing environmental regulatory systems and provide circumstances
conducive for experimental environmental lawmaking and closer coordination with
non-environmental programs.
3. Political Functions
As political conditions such as the degree of partisanship and the particular
parties in power of the Presidency and Congress change, the viability of different
forms of legislation changes as well. Differences in the features of embedded
environmental laws and the environmental law canon lead them to function
differently politically, in ways that likely affect their relative political viability.
First, the mere existence of an alternative to the canonical form of
environmental law increases the political viability of enacting some new

197. See Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
198. Jonathan B. Wiener, Radiative Forcing: Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in
Environmental Law, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210, 218 (2008). For other examples of the
ample academic literature noting the problems of fragmentation, see, for example, James M.
Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 11–12 (2000); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1147–48 (2012); Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard
L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and
Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1814–15 (2002).
199. See supra Part II.C.1.
200. See supra Part II.C.2.
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environmental law. EPA and its canonical regulatory programs have sometimes
been201—as they are currently202—a political lightning rod. The backlash against
EPA represents not only resistance to concrete aspects of the agency’s specific
programs, but also considerable use of EPA as a symbol of excessive and heavyhanded regulation more generally.203 Such conditions pose a substantial obstacle to
any legislation that would attempt to invest EPA with additional authority, and also
reduces the Agency’s ability to effectively implement its existing authorities. In
such circumstances, environmental legislation in the canonical form is politically
infeasible.204 Environmental provisions within larger non-environmental legislation
that delegates to agencies other than EPA, on the other hand, may remain viable.
Even in circumstances in which Congress might be willing to invest EPA with
additional new authority, embedded environmental legislation may remain
politically attractive. In conferring authority on EPA, Congress may be concerned
whether the agency will be willing and able to act on its delegated authority.205
Congress can mitigate the risk of EPA implementation failure, or indeed
implementation failure by any particular agency, by legislating across multiple
fronts—for example, multiple embedded environmental laws administered by
different agencies, or both canonical and embedded environmental laws—thereby
improving the likelihood that some policy to address the problem will be
implemented.206 Delegating environmental laws across a broader range of
institutions could allow other agencies to implement substitute policies when EPA
is stymied.

201. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 192, at 25 (describing a pattern of alternating “proenvironmental excess” and “anti-environmental excess” that caused EPA to suffer from
“battered agency syndrome”).
202. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also infra note 241.
203. See, e.g., John Boozman, Regulation Overload, SENATE.GOV (Jan. 22, 2013), http://
www.boozman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2013/1/regulation-overload (assailing “excessive
regulations” by various federal agencies, and citing EPA as the “biggest offender”).
204. Environmental legislation may, however, be more politically viable than
alternatives. Pennsylvania’s recently enacted Act 13, governing natural gas drilling in the
state, imposes charges on unconventional natural gas wells. The Republican governor, Tom
Corbett, has successfully defended the charges as an impact fee rather than a tax. See Brad
Bumsted, Corbett Disputes Claim that Impact Fee Is Tax, PITT. TRIB.-REV., Nov. 22, 2011
(noting Governor Corbett’s argument that the levy on unconventional natural gas drilling is not a
tax but “a fee to cover government costs associated with drilling”). But see Elizabeth Stelle &
Nathan Benefield, What’s the Difference Between a Tax and a Fee?, COMMONWEALTH FOUND.
(May 31, 2011), http://www.commonwealthfoundation.org/policyblog/detail/whats-the-difference
-between-a-tax-and-a-fee (“[T]here are many reasons why [the impact fee] more closely
represents a tax than a fee.”). Evidently new taxes can be even more politically combustible
than new environmental regulation.
205. Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 949 n.84 (2008) (“The EPA’s pattern of missing statutory deadlines
has been well documented.”).
206. See Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory
Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 292–94 (2011) (noting that redundant delegations
of regulatory authority can increase the likelihood of successful regulatory action).
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Second, the politics of embedded environmental laws differ from the politics of
the environmental law canon because embedded environmental laws are part of
legislation and programs that do not focus overall on environmental protection.
Major legislation focused on environmental protection generally has no advantages
over the status quo to offer the would-be regulated industries, as a result of which
the regulated industries generally have strong incentive to attempt to kill
environmental legislation.207 Some state governments, moreover, may resist
large-scale expansions of federal environmental regulation that displaces more
lenient state-level regulation and pressures state governments into assisting in
implementation.208 Embedded environmental provisions, by contrast, are contained
within statutes that focus on goals other than environmental protection, many of
which may be advantageous to an industry. Thus, for example,209 although farmers
may have opposed the Sodbuster and Swampbuster restrictions in isolation,
because they condition farmers’ eligibility for many federal farm program benefits
on minimum standards of protection for certain environmentally sensitive lands,210
the overall Food Security Act included numerous provisions, such as price supports
and farm loans, that benefited farmers.211
Third, the political stakes will tend to be smaller for embedded environmental
laws than for major environmental legislation. Embedded environmental laws tend
to impose lighter economic burdens on a narrower range of regulatory targets, and
therefore invite less political opposition than a major environmental statute. By
contrast, even a relatively insignificant amendment to a canonical environmental
statute can implicate large political stakes, because one attempt to amend a statute
can be perceived to create opportunities for other amendments to the statute,
quickly escalating the stakes for what started as a proposal for a small change.212
Thus, the same provision could be politically far less combustible in terms of

207. But see RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 209 (2d ed. 2006) (noting
that industries in the 1960s “acquired a powerful new interest in obtaining moderate and
uniform federal standards that would preempt more stringent and inconsistent state and local
standards,” laying the foundation for a national Clean Air Act).
208. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1995) (“State and local governments
argue that federal regulations infringe on their autonomy and sovereignty, and that they
impose costly unfunded mandates states can ill afford.”).
209. Sodbuster denies eligibility to farmers who convert highly erodible land to crop
production without an approved soil conservation system. 16 U.S.C. § 3811 (2012).
Swampbuster denies eligibility to farmers who convert a wetland to crop production. Id. § 3821.
210. See supra note 169 (explaining the Sodbuster and Swampbuster provisions).
211. See, e.g., Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 401, 99 Stat. 1354,
1395–1406 (providing loan program for feed grains); id. § 801, 99 Stat. at 1441–43
(providing price support for soybeans).
212. Cf. Fiorino, supra note 185, at 480 (“None of these constituencies is willing to
abandon the existing legal and regulatory framework without assurances that their agendas
will be protected.”); Roger P. Hansen & Theodore A. Wolff, Reviewing NEPA’s Past:
Improving NEPA’s Future, 13 ENVTL. PRAC. 235, 246 (2011) (“The problem with amending
NEPA is that it opens a Pandora’s box of amendments offered by vocal NEPA opponents to
weaken, water down, or even eliminate NEPA or its effectiveness.”).
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environmental politics as a provision of a larger piece of non-environmental
legislation than as an amendment to a major environmental statute. On the other
hand, the politics of the other field into which an embedded environmental law is
inserted are important as well. Embedding environmental provisions in nonenvironmental legislation is likely to be more politically viable than amending a
major environmental statute primarily in situations in which the non-environmental
legislation falls within a field in which there is less political controversy than in
environmental policy.213
Fourth, the fact that embedded environmental law is dispersed and involves
comparatively low stakes may make it a more difficult target for political
organizing by interest groups. This may give Congress and agencies more
discretion and autonomy in making environmental law out of the political spotlight.
The difficulties of political organizing with regard to embedded environmental
laws may, however, disproportionately burden environmental groups. Industry
groups likely are already well organized with respect to the various congressional
committees and agencies that regulate them and who would be responsible for new
embedded environmental laws—for example, the congressional agriculture
committees. Environmental groups, on the other hand, would tend to be better
organized and familiar with the committees and agencies responsible for canonical
environmental law—for example, the House Natural Resources Committee and the
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. Moreover, whereas EPA is
sometimes accused of exhibiting bias against industry,214 sector-specific agencies
such as the Department of Agriculture and Department of Transportation are often
characterized as captured by their respective industries.215 Thus, embedded
environmental laws may tend to be less stringent than environmental laws in a
canonical form. But canonical environmental legislation is often not politically
viable; embedded environmental laws may sometimes be the only available option.
Despite the potential advantages of embedded environmental laws, one type of
embedded environmental law—appropriations riders—exemplifies the potential
downsides to noncanonical environmental legislation. Appropriations riders are
isolated legislative provisions attached to larger appropriations bills to take
advantage of the larger bill’s political momentum and the relative lack of process

213. How the embedded environmental law fits into the field in which it is embedded
also affects its political viability. The political difficulty of embedding an environmental
provision in a statute of another field likely increases as the salience of the statute in the
other field increases, although the efficacy of an environmental provision embedded in a
statute of another field likely also increases as the salience of the statute in the other field
increases. See supra Part II.C.1.
214. See, e.g., MINORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS, 111TH CONG.,
EPA’S ANTI-INDUSTRIAL POLICY: “THREATENING JOBS AND AMERICA’S MANUFACTURING
BASE” (2010). But see Jeff Nesmith, Senators Attack Mercury Proposal; EPA Accused of
Pro-industry Bias, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 13, 2004, at 3A (reporting senators’ allegation
that proposed EPA regulation showed pro-industry bias).
215. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 84 n.148 (1995) (contending that industry-specific agencies are susceptible
to capture by their respective industries).
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and deliberation in appropriations legislation.216 Environmental appropriations
riders, often creating exemptions from environmental requirements, have
proliferated in recent decades,217 roughly coinciding with the ongoing legislative
stagnation on broader environmental legislation. As Richard Lazarus has observed,
this development represents a trend away from “coherent, comprehensive
environmental legislation” and toward appropriations riders as an important form
of environmental legislation, a development that Lazarus criticizes as
“nondeliberative, back-door, private deal-making” that undermines deliberative
democracy.218
Although environmental appropriations riders pose a cautionary example
regarding the potential for democratically unsound embedded environmental laws,
many embedded environmental laws do not share the defects of appropriations
riders. Embedded environmental laws such as section 4(f) of the Department of
Transportation Act219 and the Swampbuster and Sodbuster provisions of the Food
Security Act220 embody constructive environmental policies enacted through a
standard legislative process. Accordingly, the example of environmental
appropriations riders serves as a cautionary reminder of how embedded
environmental laws can be misused, but does not support a categorical critique of
embedded environmental laws.
D. Weighing Advantages and Disadvantages
As the discussion in Part II.C indicates, the distinctive features of noncanonical
environmental laws present both benefits and costs in terms of effectiveness, and
each of the potentially useful features of embedded environmental laws has a
possible downside as well:

216. Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy
in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 635–36 (2006). Perhaps the most (in)famous
environmental appropriations rider is the Energy and Water Development Appropriation
Act, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437, 449–50 (1979), which overrode the Supreme
Court’s decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), holding that the
ESA prohibited completion of the Tellico Dam project in Tennessee because it would
destroy the endangered snail darter’s habitat.
217. Lazarus, supra note 216, at 640–47.
218. Id. at 622; see also Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the
Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 476
(1997). But see Scott H. Segal & Jonathan H. Adler, Appropriations Riders and
Environmental Reform: How Appropriate? 13 (Competitive Enterprise Institute Entl.
Discussion Paper 95-3, 1995) (arguing that appropriations riders are a beneficial “means of
holding unresponsive agencies in check”). Not all environmental appropriations riders are
“anti-environmental.” See, e.g., Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-54, §§ 104–106, 119 Stat. 499, 521–22
(2005) (restricting offshore oil and gas leasing in certain areas); H.R. REP. NO. 111-316, at
109 (2009) (directing EPA “to carry out a study on the relationship between hydraulic
fracturing and drinking water”).
219. 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).
220. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811–3813 (2012); id. §§ 3821–3823.
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•

Embedding environmental law provisions in non-environmental statutes
and programs may result in more coherence among those laws, but
perhaps at the cost of inconsistency with other environmental laws.

•

Delegating environmental protection to agencies other than EPA may
broaden the scope of environmental law and policy, but other agencies
may lack expertise to understand complex environmental issues or
commitment to environmental protection.

•

Non-environmental agencies may enjoy a less acrimonious relationship
with the private sector, but they also may be less assertive regulators as
well.

•

Dispersed programs may be more agile and conducive to experimentation,
but they also may be more susceptible to regulatory capture and may
exhibit the disadvantages of fragmentation.

Because of their potential downsides, embedded environmental laws as a
category do not always function better than canonical environmental laws. In many
circumstances, the ideal environmental statute may take the form of
“comprehensive environmental legislation” that Richard Lazarus rightly lauds as
the backbone of American environmental policy.221 But broad canonical
environmental statutes are not necessarily more effective than embedded
environmental provisions in every instance. And even when perhaps theoretically
preferable, canonical environmental legislation often is politically not viable. Thus,
embedded environmental law provides a superior alternative to canonical
environmental law either where it is functionally superior to canonical
environmental law or where canonical environmental law is not available.
In addition to the possibility of substituting for canonical environmental law,
embedded environmental laws also can serve as a valuable supplement to canonical
environmental laws. Here are two examples of environmental laws administered by
non-environmental agencies and embedded within non-environmental programs,
working synergistically with canonical environmental statutes administered by
EPA.
First, the Internal Revenue Code imposes an excise tax on ozone-depleting
chemicals, with the amount of the tax increasing over time and with the ozonedepleting potential of the substance.222 The excise tax, enacted as part of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,223 supplements other regulatory

221. Lazarus, supra note 216, at 622.
222. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681–4682 (2006); see also 26 C.F.R. § 52.4682–1 (2013).
223. Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106. The tax came to be enacted through an “almost
serendipitous consensus.” Thomas A. Barthold, Issues in the Design of Environmental
Excise Taxes, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1994, at 133, 136. The World Resources Institute had
advocated for a tax on ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons in a 1986 report. J. Andrew
Hoerner, Taxing Pollution, in OZONE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 39, 39 (Elizabeth
Cook ed., 1996). In 1989, President George H.W. Bush, following an earlier similar proposal
from EPA under the Reagan Administration, see Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed.
Reg. 30,604 (proposed Aug. 12, 1988) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking asking for
public comment on a possible fee or auction for ozone-depleting substances), proposed to
restrict the consumption and production of chemicals that deplete stratospheric ozone by
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initiatives, undertaken pursuant to the Montreal Protocol and enacted as part of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, that directly limit production and
consumption of ozone-depleting substances.224 Some have concluded the excise tax
has been “probably more effective in eliminating the production of offending
chemicals than the regulatory provisions” it was intended to supplement.225
Second, a provision of the Federal Aid Highways Act226 establishes the
Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) Program, which authorizes the
Department of Transportation to use federal transportation funding to support
transportation projects that contribute to air quality improvements.227 Some specific
elements of the program specifically target projects that contribute to a state’s
efforts to attain a National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) under the
Clean Air Act.228 The CMAQ Program is consistent with a provision in the Clean
Air Act prohibiting any “department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal
Government” from approving or assisting “any activity” that does not conform to a
state’s efforts, through a state implementation plan (SIP), to attain a National
Ambient Air Quality Standard.229 The CMAQ Program, however, goes beyond
merely prohibiting efforts that undermine air quality and provides affirmative
support for projects that improve air quality. Congress added the CMAQ Program
to the Federal Aid Highways Act as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991.230
Embedded environmental laws also work synergistically with NEPA, a
canonical environmental statute not administered by EPA. When NEPA and
embedded environmental laws apply in conjunction with each other,231 NEPA’s

auctioning the rights to produce such chemicals. See Barthold, supra, at 136–37. Meanwhile,
a Congressional Budget Resolution had directed the House Ways and Means Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee to raise more revenue. See id. at 137; Hoerner, supra, at 41.
Individual members of both committees already had proposed bills that included taxes on
ozone-depleting substances, motivated in part to raise revenue and in part to address ozone
depletion. See Barthold, supra, at 137; Hoerner, supra, at 40–41. The convergence of efforts
to limit ozone-depleting and an objective to raise tax revenue created conditions conducive
to the bipartisan support that enacted the excise tax. See Barthold, supra, at 137. The dual
objectives of the tax—to protect the ozone layer and to raise revenue—highlight how the tax,
like other embedded environmental laws, falls within the fields of both tax law and
environmental law.
224. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (Aug. 12, 1988) (codified at
40 C.F.R. §§ 82.1–.13 (2013)). The Clean Air Act provisions are codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7671–7671m (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
225. John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National
Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 93 (1998).
226. 23 U.S.C. §§ 101–190 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
227. Id. § 149.
228. See id. § 149(b)(1)(A)(i).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 7506 (2006). See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Improving
Transportation-Related Air Quality Under the Clean Air Act’s Conformity Requirement and
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 631 (1997)
(describing the background of this conformity requirement).
230. Pub. L. No. 102-240, § 1008, 105 Stat. 1914, 1932.
231. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 613 F.3d 76 (2d
Cir. 2010) (applying NEPA and the Plant Protection Act to the Department of Agriculture’s
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primary contribution differs from its usual role of integrating environmental
concerns with other policy objectives. The embedded environmental laws already
put environmental concerns on the agency’s agenda. NEPA, however, integrates
embedded environmental laws into a broader body of environmental law—NEPA
law—that establishes a process and framework for considering environmental
concerns. This process and framework are especially important for agencies that
lack significant environmental experience and expertise. At the same time, because
NEPA’s dictates are broad and only procedural, it allows agencies the flexibility to
tailor their NEPA processes to their own specific statutory directives. NEPA
essentially provides institutional support for the implementation of embedded
environmental laws.232
Together, these three examples illustrate how embedded environmental statutory
provisions can supplement and complement canonical environmental statutes. Even
if they will never and should never fully displace conventional environmental laws,
noncanonical environmental laws deserve consideration as a potentially useful tool
in the environmental law toolbox.
E. Looking Forward: Three Challenges for Next-Generation Environmental Law
Although to date embedded environmental law has been overshadowed by the
environmental law canon, it has the potential to play a much more significant role
in environmental law moving forward. In particular, embedded environmental law,
by virtue of its differences from the environmental law canon, offers an alternative
model for environmental lawmaking that may complement, or even to some extent
substitute for, more conventional policy responses in addressing the major
challenges currently facing environmental law. Part II.E will discuss the potential
application of embedded environmental law to meeting three such challenges:
legislative stagnation, integration with non-environmental law, and climate change.
The attributes of embedded environmental law identified in Part II.B make
embedded environmental laws a valuable and perhaps essential component of an
effective solution to these challenges.
1. Stagnation
Environmental law, at least in Congress, has stagnated. Canonical
environmental legislation, by virtue of the size of the programs it enacts and the
costs it imposes on the industries it regulates, automatically generates resistance
and therefore requires tremendous political support to be enacted. The landmark
federal environmental statutes that comprise the environmental law canon
required—and received—broad bipartisan support in Congress when they were
regulation of importation of solid wood packaging material); Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Transp., 42 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying NEPA and section 4(f) to the
Federal Highway Administration’s approval of a tollroad project).
232. This is not to say, however, that an agency can or should attempt to meld the statutes
entirely. See, e.g., Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 203 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (noting that “[a]lthough an agency’s analysis under NEPA and the Transportation Act
might proceed in similar tracks, the two statutes are not precisely the same,” and proceeding
to identify differences therein).
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enacted in the 1970s. Support for environmental protection was a consensus
issue.233
Political conditions have changed dramatically since the 1970s. Commentators
describe a climate of “bitter partisan gridlock” 234 and a “starkly partisan divide”235
on environmental issues in Congress. Since the 1970s Democrats and Republicans
in Congress have sharply diverged in their support for environmental protection.236
Environmental issues have become a proxy for an ideological battle over the
appropriate extent of federal regulatory authority.237 “What began in 1970 as a
relatively bipartisan political issue has become, thirty years later, a largely partisan
issue about which there is little common ground between the two political
parties . . . .”238
Whatever the causes of the loss of political consensus and the increasing
politicization of environmental issues at the federal level,239 the current political
context is highly inhospitable to the enactment of major environmental legislation
and has been so for quite some time. Indeed, environmental lawmaking in Congress
has been largely at an impasse for two decades now. The last major federal
environmental statute was the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.240 The impasse
shows no signs of abating; if anything, the prospects for significant new federal
environmental legislation seem bleaker than ever. EPA has become a political
lightning rod, a target for ridicule by Republican political candidates and
congressional leaders.241 In the face of congressional inaction, EPA is forced to use
old statutes to address new environmental issues.242

233. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 8, at 224 (noting that in the early 1970s “solidly
bipartisan majorities [in Congress] vested this new agency [(EPA)] with sweeping new
powers”); Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1002, 1003 n.17 (noting the “overwhelming majorities”
and “lopsided votes” that enacted environmental statutes in the 1970s). This is not to imply
that the enactment of major federal environmental statutes during these periods was
nonpolitical. See generally, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN
COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
234. Andrews, supra note 8, at 255 (“For the present, it is clear that any hope of
significant environmental policy reform in Congress continues to be held hostage to bitter
partisan gridlock . . . .”).
235. Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1004 (“Today, however, a starkly partisan divide exists in
environmental law.”).
236. Id. at 1012–13.
237. See Andrews, supra note 8, at 238.
238. Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1019.
239. See ANDREWS, supra note 207, at 350–51 (discussing some causes, including a
reassertion of organized opposition from business interests, passive public support, and the
use of the environment as a symbolic issue).
240. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. Congress enacted two somewhat significant
environmental statutes in 1996—the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-170, 110 Stat. 1489, and the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613—but neither would qualify as part of the environmental law
canon, a major environmental law on the order of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
or the landmark legislation of the 1970s.
241. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 14.
242. For example, although the Clean Air Act is not well-suited to address climate
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In the current era of extreme partisanship and political stalemate, especially in
environmental policy, embedded environmental law’s distinctive features are likely
to give it more political viability than canonical environmental law. Embedded
environmental laws avoid EPA, instead delegating authority to agencies such as the
Department of Agriculture that may enjoy more bipartisan support in Congress.
Embedded environmental laws can be part of a legislative package, such as an
energy policy bill or farm bill, that contains many elements advantageous to
industry. Embedded environmental laws involve smaller political stakes and are
more conducive to innovative and experimental policy solutions that may enjoy
broader political appeal.
Recent legislative events support the proposition that environmental laws
outside the canon may be more politically viable than environmental laws in a
canonical form. Despite the legislative gridlock of the last decade, Congress
recently has enacted some significant—not major, but nevertheless significant—
pieces of environmental legislation:
•

The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act of 2006243 amended and reauthorized the MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,244 the primary federal
statute regulating fisheries.245

•

The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008,246 also known as the
2008 Farm Bill, contained a provision that significantly amended the
Lacey Act,247 a 1900 statute that prohibits trafficking in illegal fish,
wildlife, or plants. The 2008 amendments expanded the Lacey Act’s scope
to include more plants and plant products, including illegally logged
timber.248

•

The Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009,249 an amalgamation
of 164 separate bills relating to public lands, among other things
designated millions of acres of new wilderness and a thousand miles of
new wild and scenic rivers.250

All three of these statutes exhibit markedly noncanonical characteristics. The
Lacey Act amendment exemplifies the features of embedded environmental law.
change, in the absence of climate change legislation, EPA has been forced to take regulatory
action to address climate change under the Clean Air Act. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that EPA could avoid taking regulatory action under the Clean Air
Act with respect to greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles only if it were to
determine that such greenhouse gas emissions do not contribute to climate change).
243. Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007).
244. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891d (2012).
245. See Robin Kundis Craig, Taking the Long View of Ocean Ecosystems: Historical
Science, Marine Restoration, and the Oceans Act of 2000, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 649, 668 (2002).
246. Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651.
247. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (2012).
248. Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 8204, 122 Stat. at 2052–56.
249. Pub. L. No. 111-11, 123 Stat. 991.
250. See Congress Votes ‘Yes’ to Sweeping Public Lands Protection Act, ENV’T NEWS
SERVICE NEWSWIRE, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2009/2009-03
-25-01.asp.
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Although the Magnuson-Stevens amendments and the Omnibus Public Land statute
fall within the category of subcanonical environmental laws rather than embedded
environmental laws, they share several key features in common with embedded
environmental laws, and these features contribute to their political viability.
First, none of these new statutes is administered by EPA. The National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), an agency within the Department of
Commerce, administers the Magnuson-Stevens Act.251 The Department of
Agriculture, and specifically the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,
enforces the new Lacey Act provisions.252 Various federal land management
agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management, Forest Service, and National Park
Service, administer the newly designated public lands.253
Second, all three statutes pursue additional objectives beyond environmental
concerns—that is, they are “mixed-motive” environmental statutes. The
Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act includes provisions sought by the fishing
industry to manage fisheries.254 The Lacey Act amendments protect U.S. timber
companies from underpriced imports.255 The Omnibus Public Land Act includes new
historical parks and water supply projects.256
Third, the three statutes sweep narrowly compared with canonical environmental
statutes. Although they are significant, fisheries management, illegally logged timber,
and new public lands designations do not match the breadth of the canonical
environmental statutes, which regulate large swaths of the American economy.
Not only was Congress able to enact these statutes during a period of overall
political stagnation on environmental issues, it was able to do so on a bipartisan basis
with wide margins. The reauthorization of Magnuson-Stevens was bipartisan
compromise legislation, endorsed by both conservation groups and the fishing
industry257 and passed in both the House and Senate by voice vote.258 The Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act and Omnibus Public Land Management Act passed by
wide bipartisan margins in both the House and Senate.259

251. See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., MAGNUSON-STEVENS
REAUTHORIZATION ACT FACT SHEET (2008), available at http://www.noaa.gov/factsheets
/new%20version/magstevens.pdf.
252. See, e.g., Implementation of Revised Lacey Act Provisions, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,874
(Feb. 28, 2011).
253. See Omnibus Public Land Management Act, 123 Stat. 993–95 (identifying the
agency associated with each set of new authorizations).
254. See Allison A. Freeman, Attention Turns to House as Magnuson Breezes Through
Senate, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, June 20, 2006 (quoting a statement approving elements of the
legislation by a representative of the National Fisheries Institute, a fishing industry group).
255. See Dan Berman, Illegal Timber, Omnibus Parks Bills Lead House Suspension
Calendar, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 3, 2007.
256. See, e.g., Omnibus Public Land Act §§ 7001–7003, 9101–9115, 123 Stat. at 1183–
89, 1298–1321.
257. See Freeman, supra note 254 (noting that the legislation passed the Senate by
unanimous consent and that “[g]roups representing the fishing industry and environment and
ocean advocates applauded the legislation”).
258. See Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 5946, LIBRARY CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi
-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR05946:@@@R.
259. See Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 146, LIBRARY CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi
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It is reasonable to conclude that the noncanonical character of these three statutes
contributed to their political viability. The absence of EPA from the debate, the
relatively confined scope of the legislation, and the multiple objectives of the
legislation all enabled negotiation and compromise that eventually resulted in passage
of the statutes. The absence of EPA, a political lightning rod, dampened opposition to
the bills by reducing the political temperature of the debate. Perhaps most important,
the multiple objectives of the three statutes increased support for the bills by
broadening beyond environmentalists the range of interests who perceived a benefit
over the status quo. Fishing interests joined conservationists in supporting the
Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act because it contained changes perceived as
beneficial over the existing statute.260 The American Forest and Paper Association
joined environmentalists in supporting the Lacey Act amendments because it
protected domestic timber suppliers from competition from illegally harvested
imports.261 Tribes joined environmentalists in supporting the Omnibus Public Land
Act because it included water development projects and tribal cultural protections
beneficial to them.262
This is not to say that passage of the statutes was uncontroversial or nonpolitical.
The Magnuson Stevens Act required extensive negotiations among different camps of
legislators and competing versions of legislation, prodded along at key points by
Senator Ted Stevens, who was seeking a coda to his Senate career.263 The Lacey Act
amendments were revised in committee to reduce compliance burdens, and
languished in committee before finally being inserted into the broader Farm Bill.264
The Omnibus Public Land Act triggered substantial opposition from Republicans.265
But, unlike recent attempts to enact canonical environmental legislation, these three
statutes were able to overcome the political obstacles in their paths and to gain

-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR00146:@@@R (noting the Omnibus Public Land Act passed the
Senate by a 77–20 vote and the House by a 285–140 vote); H.R. 2419 (110th): Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us
/congress/bills/110/hr2419 (noting the legislation passed the House by a 318–106 vote and
the Senate by a 79-14 vote, followed by similar votes to override President Bush’s veto).
260. See Freeman, supra note 254.
261. See Illegal Logging: Lacey Act, AM. FOREST & PAPER ASS’N (July 2013),
http://www.afandpa.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/lacey-act-one-pager
-july-2013.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
262. See, e.g., Omnibus Public Land Management Act §§ 1506, 9106, 123 Stat. at 1040,
1304–09.
263. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 254; Lauren Morello & Allison A. Freeman,
Magnuson-Stevens Still in Play as Activists Plan for Dem Congress, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY,
Nov. 10, 2006; Allison Freeman Winter, Stevens Attempts to Revive Magnuson with New
Proposal, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 7, 2006; Allison Freeman Winter, Last-Gasp Attempts
at Magnuson Dead in Water—Rep. Gilchrest, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 6, 2006.
264. See Berman, supra note 255.
265. See Patrick O’Connor, House GOP Derails Public Lands Bill, POLITICO (Mar. 11,
2009, 2:25 PM EDT), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/19894.html; R.J. Smith,
Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 on House Floor Today—170 Bills in One; Half
Have Had No Hearings, AMY RIDENOUR’S NAT’L CENTER BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009, 3:01 AM),
http://www.conservativeblog.org/amyridenour/2009/3/11/omnibus-public-land-management
-act-of-2009-on-house-floor-to.html.

1286

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:1239

passage, even by wide margins.266 In short, they succeeded where proposals for
canonical environmental legislation have failed.
Three anecdotal examples cannot prove a general conclusion, but they do
provide some evidence supporting the idea that noncanonical environmental laws
can remain politically viable during periods of strong partisan conflict over
environmental issues when attempts to enact new canonical environmental laws
may be thwarted. The history of embedded environmental legislation provides
further support for this proposition. Unlike canonical environmental law, which has
tended to be enacted during a specific period from 1970 to 1990, Congress enacted
embedded environmental laws before,267 during,268 and after269 the heyday of
canonical environmental legislation.
2. Integration
Environmental law’s shortcomings can be measured by the mismatch that exists
between environmental problems and environmental law. In part because of the
political stagnation on environmental issues, existing environmental laws do not
adequately address environmental problems. The Clean Water Act, for example,
largely exempts nonpoint source discharges, even though such pollution is a major
cause of impaired water quality.270 Meanwhile, science continues to identify new
potential hazards, such as chemical toxicity at low exposure levels previously
assumed safe.271
Not all the mismatch between environmental problems and environmental law
arises from a lack of law; the law itself contributes to some environmental
problems. Numerous laws incentivize conduct that causes environmental harm. For
example, tax breaks for the oil and gas industry subsidize fossil fuel production and
therefore consumption and its associated air pollutant emissions.272

266. See supra notes 258–59.
267. See, e.g., Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063, 1068 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (2012)); Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No.
89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2006)).
268. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, §§ 1221–1223, 99 Stat. 1354
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821–3823 (2012)) (Swampbuster).
269. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1501, 119 Stat. 594, 1067–76
(amending Clean Air Act § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545).
270. See Jonathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 608, 616
(2008) (“Unregulated nonpoint source pollution is solely responsible for failure of 30 to 50
percent of U.S. waterbodies to meet water quality standards and is a contributing factor in an
even larger percentage.”).
271. Jody A. Roberts, Collision Course? Science, Law, and Regulation in the Emerging
Science of Low Dose Toxicity, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2009); see also Daniel A. Farber,
Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791, 791 (1994)
(“The expansion of scientific knowledge has revealed new environmental problems . . . .”).
272. See John A. Bogdanski, Reflections on the Environmental Impacts of Federal Tax
Subsidies for Oil, Gas, and Timber Production, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323, 325–28
(2011); Roberta Mann, Waiting to Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 AM. U. L.
REV. 1135, 1164–68 (2002); Temi Kolarova, Comment, Oil and Taxes: Refocusing the Tax
Policy Question in the Aftermath of the BP Oil Spill, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 351, 357–66
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Laws such as these that unintentionally yet significantly affect the environment
are generally excluded from what we consider environmental law, because they do
not deliberately address environmental concerns.273 Yet if the project of
environmental law at its most fundamental level is to think critically and
comprehensively about the relationship between law and the environment, then
unintentional environmental laws should be integral to environmental law.
Excluding laws that have inadvertent environmental impacts creates a problematic
divide between environmental problems and environmental law. Indeed, addressing
unintentional environmental laws may well be among the most efficacious
endeavors the field can undertake.
As environmental law has matured, awareness has grown that the goal of
environmental protection is highly implicated elsewhere other than within the
domain addressed by existing canonical environmental law. Proposals for
environmental reforms seem increasingly aimed to address environmental concerns
as they arise outside of environmental law, such as in land use,274 energy,275 and
food production.276 Underlying these proposals is the premise that environmental
concerns should suffuse the law generally to the same extent that environmental
impacts do; wherever there are environmental problems, there should be
environmental law.277
(2012). See generally Barthold, supra note 223, at 133 (noting other examples of tax
provisions with unintentionally adverse environmental consequences).
273. See supra note 23 (defining environmental law as laws that deliberately address
human impacts on the environment).
274. See, e.g., Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land
Use Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231 (2008); John R. Nolon, Comparative
Land Use Law: Patterns of Sustainability, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 855 (2006).
275. See, e.g., Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect,
supra note 32; Amy J. Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of Energy Law and
Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369 (2011).
276. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, Food, Law & the Environment: Informational and
Structural Changes for a Sustainable Food System, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 263 (2011); Neil
D. Hamilton, The Role of Law in Promoting Sustainable Agriculture: Reflections on Ten Years
of Experience in the United States, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 423 (1998); Michael R. Taylor, The
Emerging Merger of Agricultural and Environmental Policy: Building a New Vision for the
Future of American Agriculture, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 169, 170 (2001); see also Ristino & Kalen,
supra note 13, at 52 (“The environmental law of the future must incorporate energy, food,
transportation, land use, and water, just to name a few. And it must do so unconstrained by our
existing, arguably simplistic, federalist, regional, and local models.”).
277. Many of these proposals to expand the reach of environmental concerns in the law
invoke the principle of sustainability as a conceptual foundation. See, e.g., Robert L.
Glicksman, Sustainable Federal Land Management: Protecting Ecological Integrity and
Preserving Environmental Principal, 44 TULSA L. REV. 147, 151 (2008); Hamilton, supra note
276; Nolon, supra note 274. The ambiguity of the related terms sustainability and sustainable
development have led some scholars, however, to doubt their usefulness as conceptual anchors.
See Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 64 (2000) (“The problem with the sustainable development
concept is that it is subject to a variety of interpretations.”); Glicksman, supra, at 148 (“The
various formulations of sustainability have been criticized as, among other things, vague,
slippery, oxymoronic, a ‘mask[er] [of] failed consensus,’ and a reflection of political
correctness.” (footnotes omitted)); J.B. Ruhl, Law for Sustainable Development: Work
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Canonical environmental law does not, however, offer an attractive or viable
model for integrating environmental concerns into the law. Treating canonical
environmental law as the sole model for an expansion of environmental law would
erect a substantial barrier to entry into the field that is unlikely to be overcome
except in rare circumstances. Canonical environmental laws are big. The
environmental law canon regulates rather intensively, in terms of the burdens it
places both on regulated parties who must comply with its requirements and on
regulatory agencies that must administer and enforce the requirements. This
intensity and the burdens it entails may be entirely appropriate for the
environmental problems that the environmental law canon addresses—the
environmental law canon has tended to focus on the most pressing environmental
problems, which potentially call for comparatively intensive regulatory
responses—but intense regulation is not necessarily appropriate for all
environmental problems. Limiting the options of environmental law to large,
intense regulatory programs limits environmental law’s viable domain.
Moreover, integrating environmental concerns into new areas of law that
currently unintentionally yet significantly affect the environment will require a
better integration of environmental concerns with other policy objectives.278 The
environmental law canon, by design, focuses overwhelmingly on environmental
concerns. Although statutes within the canon usually mandate some balance
between environmental protection and other non-environmental goals, the intent
and effect of such balancing is merely to moderate the stringency of environmental
protection so as to mitigate other adverse non-environmental regulatory impacts,
not to affirmatively pursue other goals. For example, section 202 of the Clean Air
Act directs EPA to establish emissions standards for new motor vehicles “which
reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable” while “giving
appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety factors.”279 The inclusion of
cost, energy, and safety as factors for EPA to consider may lead EPA to moderate
the stringency of the emission reduction it requires pursuant to section 202. But in
doing so section 202 is merely mitigating its impacts on these factors, not
affirmatively promoting them—section 202 considers safety, but it is not a safety
regulation.280 Unintentional environmental laws, however, do pursue and promote
other, non-environmental objectives. As a result, adding environmental concerns

Continues on the Rubik’s Cube, 44 TULSA L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2008) (noting that the concept of
sustainable development is in part “window dressing,” “a way of masking over problems,” “a
way of demanding more than is possible,” and “a way of promising more than is possible,”
“which goes a long way toward explaining why it has become so powerful a policy concept”).
278. Cf. John C. Dernbach, Achieving Sustainable Development: The Centrality and
Multiple Facets of Integrated Decisionmaking, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 247, 250
(2003) (arguing that integrated decision making—decision making that integrates
environmental and other objectives—is the foundation of sustainable development).
279. Clean Air Act § 202(a)(3)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
280. Canonical environmental statutes do, however, sometimes contain individual
provisions that pursue objectives entirely independent of the statute’s overall environmental
protection goal. Clean Water Act § 513, 33 U.S.C. § 1372 (2006), for example, requires
laborers and mechanics constructing treatment works using federal grants under the Clean
Water Act to be paid prevailing wages. It is a labor law, administered by the Labor
Department, but otherwise embedded in an environmental statute.
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into unintentional environmental laws will require integrating environmental and
non-environmental goals in a way that the environmental law canon has not
attempted.
Embedded environmental law may offer a better model than canonical
environmental law for pursuing environmental protection in the frontier areas
outside of the traditional domain of environmental law. Whereas canonical
environmental law gives environmental protection primacy and is segregated from
other, non-environmental law, embedded environmental law integrates
substantively and institutionally with non-environmental law.281 The environmental
policies that result from such an integration will no doubt depart from the dominant
model of the environmental law canon, but that can be a positive development.
Delegating environmental authority to non-environmental agencies, for example,
could serve as an important step toward inculcating environmental values in
agencies that have not tended to view environmental protection as an important
objective within their programs. For example, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development has relied on statutory authority in the form of embedded
environmental provisions to require new public housing to comply with energy
efficiency standards.282
3. Climate Change
The massive and “super wicked”283 problem of anthropogenic climate change
looms over all other environmental issues. Despite the legislative paralysis on the

281. NEPA, by requiring federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of their
proposed actions even when those actions are taken pursuant to non-environmental statutes,
does some of the work of integrating environmental concerns into non-environmental law.
But NEPA’s requirements are purely procedural and not substantive—it requires agencies
only to consider the environmental effects of their proposed actions, not to give any weight
to environmental concerns. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
350 (1989). This significantly limits NEPA’s efficacy and makes the statute an imperfect
substitute for substantive environmental requirements. Cf. The National Environmental
Policy Act 40th Anniversary Symposium, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,183, 11,195 (2010)
(transcribing an unidentified audience member’s comment that “NEPA is procedural, it is in
many instances window-dressing”).
282. See 42 U.S.C. § 12709 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (requiring Secretary to establish
standards); id. § 12745(a)(1)(F) (requiring compliance with standards); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-46, GREEN AFFORDABLE HOUSING 11 (2008) (concluding
that HUD had taken “positive steps” to promote energy efficiency but could do more within
its existing authority).
283. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159–60 (2009) (explaining
that climate change is a “super wicked problem” because of its “enormous
interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders,” because “the
longer it takes to address the problem, the harder it will be to do so,” because “”those who
are in the best position to address the problem . . . [have] the least immediate incentive to
act,” and because of “the absence of an existing institutional framework of government with
the ability to develop, implement, and maintain the laws necessary to address a problem of
climate change’s tremendous spatial and temporal scope”); see also Kelly Levin, Benjamin
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issue,284 EPA is moving forward with addressing climate change under its existing
statutory authorities, primarily the Clean Air Act.285 But no one believes that current
laws, even if they are better than nothing, offer the best policy mechanisms for
addressing climate change.
The dominant proposals to date have involved some type of statutory program that
would regulate greenhouse gas emissions in a form resembling the statutes of the
environmental law canon, such as a cap-and-trade emissions program administered
by EPA.286 Such a program has not been viable politically at the national level.
Moreover, some academics, policy analysts, and environmental advocates have
questioned whether a global system of conventional pollution regulation is the best
model for addressing climate change. Some of these critics argue that conventional
environmental regulation is ill-suited to the unprecedented challenges that climate
change poses, and instead favor a strategy of quickly moving the economy toward the
use of low-carbon energy sources through direct public investment in technological
innovation.287 Others are less critical of conventional regulation, but advocate for
sector-specific policies as an alternative to a system that universally regulates
greenhouse gas emissions.288
Alternative approaches of these types—direct investment or sector-specific
regulation—could take the form of embedded environmental laws. Such programs
could be designed to take advantage of the best features of embedded environmental
laws: dispersed, relatively small programs that reduce the political stakes and
facilitate experimentation and context-specific policy solutions.
Cashore, Steven Bernstein & Graeme Auld, Playing It Forward: Path Dependency,
Progressive Incrementalism, and the “Super Wicked” Problem of Global Climate Change, 5–
7 (June 3, 2010), available at http://environment.research.yale.edu/documents/downloads/0-9
/2010_super_wicked_levin_cashore_bernstein_auld.pdf (originating the term “super wicked”
and applying it to the problem of climate change).
284. See generally Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill
Effort in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A15; Ryan Lizza, supra note 12; Elizabeth
Kolbert, Uncomfortable Climate, NEW YORKER, Nov. 22, 2010, at 53.
285. See Climate Change: Regulatory Initiatives, EPA, http://www.epa.gov
/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.html (last updated Sept. 24, 2013).
286. See Res. for the Future, Summary of Notable Market-Based Climate Change Bills
Introduced in the 111th Congress, RFF.ORG (May 12, 2010), http://www.rff.org/Documents
/Features/111th%20_Legislation_Table_Graph.pdf.
287. See, e.g., HOWARD A. LATIN, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY FAILURES: WHY
CONVENTIONAL MITIGATION APPROACHES CANNOT SUCCEED 162–70 (2012); MCKINSEY &
CO., PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY 32–34, 59–129 (2009); TED NORDHAUS &
MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, THE EMERGING CLIMATE CONSENSUS: GLOBAL WARMING POLICY
IN A POST-ENVIRONMENTAL WORLD 14 (2009), available at http://www.thebreakthrough.org
/blog/PDF/EmergingClimateConsensus.pdf.
288. See, e.g., PEW CTR. FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, POLICIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS
FROM THE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR 3 (2008) (“[S]ector-specific measures to promote
energy efficiency and low carbon technologies may be needed to ensure significant GHG
reductions from transportation.”); Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, Toward an
International Aviation Emissions Agreement, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 385 (2012)
(arguing in favor of an international greenhouse gas emissions reduction agreement specific
to the aviation sector); Jake Schmidt, Ned Helme, Jin Lee & Mark Houdashelt, Sector-Based
Approach to the Post-2012 Climate Change Policy Architecture, 8 CLIMATE POL’Y 494
(2008) (arguing the advantages of a sector-based approach).
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First, relatively small climate change programs dispersed throughout government
would have potentially greater political viability than a universal emissions system of
regulation administered by EPA. Much of the private sector already regards EPA as
heavy handed and draconian in its orientation and is likely to regard EPA regulation
with particular suspicion and with a proclivity and history of organizing political
opposition to the Agency’s initiatives. The private sector is more likely to be open to
initiatives from other agencies. Many other agencies, especially sector-specific
agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, Department of Transportation, and
Department of Energy, administer a wide variety of programs, both regulatory and
nonregulatory, many of which proactively assist the sector. Like other embedded
environmental laws, climate policies could be integrated into broader programs that
pursue a variety of objectives.
Second, dispersed climate change programs could facilitate experimentation and
context-specific policy solutions better than a centralized system of universal
emissions regulation. Such a strategy could involve broad policy principles
coordinated across government, but implemented through sector-specific policies
administered by sector-specific agencies such as the Department of Agriculture,
Department of Transportation, and Department of Energy. In the absence of
comprehensive policy, specific climate policies could be used to experiment with
various strategies that could be utilized to implement future comprehensive
regulation. For example, agricultural policies that nudge farms toward less carbonintensive energy consumption could mitigate the impacts of an eventual
comprehensive cap-and-trade or carbon tax that would significantly raise the cost of
carbon-intensive fuels.
Regardless of whether dispersed sector-specific climate policies would
supplement or substitute for a system of universal climate emissions regulations,
dispersed climate policies in the form of embedded environmental laws could by
virtue of their distinct functional features provide significant benefits beyond what a
universal uniform regulatory system could attain.
III. UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In addition to offering a model for environmental lawmaking that provides a
potentially important alternative to the environmental law canon, noncanonical
environmental laws can generate important conceptual insights. In particular,
noncanonical environmental laws, by virtue of their location at the periphery of the
field of environmental law, can offer illumination into some of environmental law’s
existential issues.
A. Expanding the Recognized Domain
Including noncanonical environmental laws in the study of environmental law
expands the recognized domain of environmental law beyond the canon that currently
predominates in the field. Bringing environmental laws from outside of the canon
into the study of environmental law broadens the scope of laws associated with the
field overall. This more expansive view of environmental law reveals the field’s
topography to be more varied than it appears from conventional viewpoints that focus
solely on the canon. Embedded environmental laws, for example, evidence that
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environmental law has been produced in forms and at times quite different than the
canon of major regulatory programs that arose during the Environmental Revolution
of the 1970s.289 Expanding the scope of recognized environmental law beyond the
canon thus reveals the form of the canon—including the problems it addresses, the
institutions it has created, and the regulatory mechanisms it employs—to be a
contingent product of a particular historical moment. The environmental law canon is
not merely the result of Americans embracing environmental values, but rather also
involved a series of choices regarding how to embody environmental values in the
law. Embedded environmental laws thus can remind us of the underappreciated
diversity of ways in which law can pursue environmental protection. To borrow John
Witt’s observations in a different context, conventional accounts of the development
of environmental law often “tacitly assume a determinate relation between a
particular course of social change . . . and a particular regime or doctrinal structure”
in environmental law.290 Embedded environmental laws counteract a tendency to
assume the inevitability or essentiality of the environmental law canon.
B. Central and Peripheral Cases
At a deeper conceptual level, noncanonical environmental laws can provide
material for the exploration of some of the central questions about the field to an
extent that environmental laws within the canon cannot do by themselves. To see
how, we can analogize the distinction between the environmental law canon and
noncanonical environmental laws to the distinction in legal philosophy drawn
between a central case and a peripheral or limit case.
Scholars of legal philosophy exploring the concept of law have differentiated
between law in its central case, which lies at the heart of the category of law, and law
in its peripheral or limit case.291 Here, a central case is an instance of something
within a category that exhibits all the features properly associated with the category; a
peripheral case does not have all of these features, but enough of them to fall within
the category.292 Although there is disagreement about the extent to which productive
analytical inquiry should focus on central cases versus peripheral cases, there seems

289. See supra notes 267–69 and accompanying text (noting that embedded
environmental laws have been enacted during times in which canonical environmental
lawmaking has not been active).
290. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 9 (2004) (“[B]oth of the
conventional historical accounts [of the development of modern American accident law]
tacitly assume a determinate relation between a particular course of social change
(industrialization) or a new intellectual development (changing ideas about causation) and a
particular regime or doctrinal structure in accident law.”).
291. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 9–11 (2d ed. 2011); John
Gardner, Nearly Natural Law, 52 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 10–18 (2007). Finnis traces the central case
concept to Aristotle’s focal meaning and Max Weber’s ideal-type. FINNIS, supra, at 9.
292. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 150 (1999) (contrasting “typical
cases” in which the signature traits of a category “are manifested to a very high degree” and
“borderline cases” “in which all or some [traits] are present only to a lesser degree”); see
Gardner, supra note 291, at 15 n.25 (“There are various limit cases in which one or other of
these features is lacking, while others remain.”).
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to be some agreement that considering both types of cases in combination facilitates
the appreciation of the overall category to its fullest. Thus, John Finnis contends that
one can move from an examination of the central case to an examination of peripheral
cases that “trace[s] the network of similarities and differences, the analogies and
disanalogies, . . . between them and the central cases.”293 And John Gardner notes that
neglecting either the central case or peripheral cases leads to analyses that “provide[]
only a partial account of their subject.”294
For the field of environmental law, the canon represents a type of central case, and
noncanonical environmental law a peripheral case.295 Like the central case, the
canonical environmental statutes exhibit all the features associated with
environmental law—national pollution statutes enacted primarily for the purpose of
protecting the environment and administered by EPA—with the notable exception of
NEPA and the Endangered Species Act.296 Noncanonical environmental laws, on the
other hand, have enough features associated with the field that they are recognized as
environmental law—most notably, a goal of environmental protection—but do not
exhibit many of the features otherwise associated with the field.297
Despite its location at the periphery of the field, however—indeed, because of its
location at the periphery of the field—noncanonical environmental law is crucial to
understanding environmental law overall, including canonical environmental law. For
example, noncanonical environmental laws raise, in a much more acute way than the
statutes in the environmental law canon, the question of what is environmental and
what is not.
C. Blurring the Boundaries
The field of environmental law is generally defined to encompass laws with a
goal of environmental protection or limiting ecological impacts.298 But precisely

293. FINNIS, supra note 291, at 11.
294. Gardner, supra note 291, at 23.
295. Scholars who have used the central-versus-peripheral case framework have tended to
attach a direct normative superiority to the central case. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 291, at 3
(describing the central case as “the case that shows how the other cases . . . ought to be”). But
one can move from the normative, wherein the central case represents what the category ought to
be, to the descriptive, wherein, for example, the central case represents what the category is
generally thought to be. Of course, even identifying certain characteristics of a law as salient
makes an indirectly evaluative judgment, insofar as it indicates that those characteristics are
important to a normative evaluation of the law. See JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION AND LEGAL
THEORY 51–67 (2001).
296. See supra Part I.B.2.
297. See supra Part II.B.
298. See supra note 23; see also, e.g., JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 1. (“Environmental
Law is law designed to protect the environment, and the plants and animals that rely on it,
including us.”); LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 1 (“[E]nvironmental law regulates human activity in
order to limit ecological impacts that threaten public health and biodiversity.”); Michael C.
Blumm, Studying Environmental Law: A Brief Overview and Readings for a Seminar, 12 J.
ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 309, 310 (1992) (“Environmental law is a loose amalgam
of common law and (increasingly) statutory provisions designed to protect public health,
ecosystems, and dependent animal and plant species.”).
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what objectives fall within this category is unclear. Traditional notions of what
constitutes nature or the environment have been criticized as based on naïve visions
“of a pristine nature that exists apart from people.”299
Statutes within the environmental law canon tend not to clarify the issue,
because their goals of protecting environmental public health and ecological
concerns reside at the core of environmental law. The environmental-ness of these
statutes is so obvious that we need not—and generally do not—explain how they
are environmental. With respect to many environmental laws outside the canon,
however, the environmental-ness is not so straightforward or clear:
•

Energy Efficiency. Congress originally enacted fuel economy standards for
vehicles as part of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 to
reduce demand for oil during the Oil Shock of the 1970s.300 Subsequent
amendments to the statute—like energy policy generally—have to some
extent incorporated environmental protection.301

•

Safety Statutes. Statutes such as the Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act302 and the Pipeline Safety Act303 regulate to protect against accidents
that threaten public safety. Accidents involving hazardous materials or
pipelines clearly have adverse environmental effects, but the statutory
purposes refer only to protection of “life and property.”304

•

Food Safety. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)305
includes provisions that regulate food safety.306 One such provision,
enacted as part of the Food Quality Protection Act’s307 amendments to the
FFDCA, directs EPA to establish tolerances for pesticide residues in

299. Keith Kloor, The Great Schism in the Environmental Movement, SLATE (Dec. 12,
2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2012/12/modern
_green_movement_eco_pragmatists_are_challenging_traditional_environmentalists.html;
see also William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong
Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: TOWARD REINVENTING NATURE 69 (William Cronon ed.,
1995).
300. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 2, 89 Stat.
871, 874 (1975).
301. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121
Stat. 1492. The EISA, although still focused on energy independence and security, includes
among its aims references to concerns that are clearly environmental—for example, “clean
renewable fuels” and “greenhouse gas capture and storage.” 121 Stat. at 1492.
302. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5128 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
303. 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101–60140.
304. See 49 U.S.C. § 5101 (“The purpose of this chapter is to protect against the risks to
life, property, and the environment that are inherent in the transportation of hazardous
material in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.”); 49 U.S.C. § 60102(a) (“The
purpose of this chapter is to provide adequate protection against risks to life and property
posed by pipeline transportation and pipeline facilities by improving the regulatory and
enforcement authority of the Secretary of Transportation.”).
305. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
306. Id. §§ 341–350l-1.
307. Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).
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food.308 Pesticide tolerances are directed at the same public health goal as
other food regulations in the FFDCA, such as prohibitions against false or
misleading labeling on foods.309 Pesticide use does, however, have
significant environmental implications, which are regulated under other
statutes.310
•

Invasive species. Invasive species can have devastating ecological
consequences.311 The Plant Protection Act, which aims to prevent the
spread of invasive plant pests and weeds, mentions environmental
protection as a goal,312 but focuses primarily on impacts on agriculture.

•

Conservation. Some conservation, such as the national parks system,313
seems obviously to fall within the ambit of environmental protection.
Other statutes, however, contemplate conservation for the purpose of
maintaining supplies of a natural resource for future commercial
exploitation.314 Still other laws fall somewhere in between.315 Whether
laws that pursue conservation are environmental laws may depend on what
resource is being conserved and for what purpose.

308. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b).
309. Id. § 343.
310. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136–136(y) (2012).
311. See, e.g., H.R. 6311, The Non-native Wildlife Invasion Prevention Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife & Oceans of the H. Comm. on Natural Res.,
110th Cong. 31 (2008) (statement of Marc Gaden, Ph.D., Legislative Liaison, Great Lakes
Fishery Commission) (noting the sea lamprey “laid waste to the [Great Lakes] fishery after it
invaded the Upper Great Lakes in the 1920s”); Thomas H. Fritts & Dawn Leasman-Tanner,
The Brown Treesnake on Guam, USGS.GOV (2001) http://www.fort.usgs.gov/resources
/education/bts/ (noting the proliferation of nonnative brown tree snakes on Guam has wiped
out much of the island’s population of birds and small mammals).
312. 7 U.S.C. § 7701(1) (2012) (“[T]he detection, control, eradication, suppression,
prevention, or retardation of the spread of plant pests or noxious weeds is necessary for the
protection of the agriculture, environment, and economy of the United States.”).
313. For example, the National Park Service Organic Act directs the Park Service to
manage national parks, monuments, and reservations “to conserve the scenery and the
natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the
same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations.” National Park Service Organic Act § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
314. A 1955 statute, for example, authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to assist the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in controlling and draining water from anthracite mine
formations to “conserve natural resources,” because “the presence of large volumes of water
in anthracite coal formations involves serious wastage of the fuel resources of the Nation.”
30 U.S.C. § 571 (2006).
315. For example, the Department of Agriculture’s soil conservation programs tie the
abatement of soil erosion to a variety of concerns, some environmental and some not,
although the program focuses overall on maintaining agricultural productivity. 16 U.S.C.
590a (“[I]t is declared to be the policy of Congress to provide permanently for the control
and prevention of soil erosion to preserve soil, water, and related resources, promote soil and
water quality, control floods, prevent impairment of reservoirs, and maintain the navigability
of rivers and harbors, protect public health, public lands and relieve unemployment . . . .”).
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As these examples illustrate, considering noncanonical environmental laws both
clarifies and muddies efforts to define what it means for a law to be an
environmental law. On the one hand, focusing on the limit cases of the field
(noncanonical environmental laws) can lead us to posit what seems to be a
plausible conceptual delineation of the field’s boundary: environmental laws
intentionally regulate human causes of ecological disruption. On the other hand, the
fact that many noncanonical environmental laws also seem to lie as well within
other recognized fields—such as transportation or agriculture—strongly indicates
that environmental law, especially at its periphery, overlaps considerably with
related fields. Environmental law, from this viewpoint, does not so much as end as
it does fade into other, overlapping fields.
D. Practical Implications
The question of what is environmental has considerable practical as well as
theoretical import. What is categorized as environmental—as opposed to
agricultural, for example—matters because the classification of an issue as
environmental affects the institutions that are called upon to address it (e.g., which
congressional committee, which agency), the interest groups that mobilize to
support or oppose it, the regulatory model assumed for creating law to address the
issue, and even the theoretical approaches to analyzing the issue.
The Swampbuster provision offers an example. Although the provision was
enacted to conserve wetlands—a type of environmental protection—Congress
enacted the Swampbuster as part of the Food Security Act,316 a farm bill that went
through the House Agriculture Committee317 and Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry Committee;318 was delegated to the Department of Agriculture for
implementation; and took the form of a condition on farm subsidies rather than a
direct restriction. The same objective of wetlands conservation could be pursued—
and has been pursued319—in the form of environmental legislation that would go
through the House Resources Committee and Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee, delegated to an environmental agency for implementation, and
in the form of a direct restriction on the use of wetlands.
Occupational exposure to toxic substances provides another example. The
Occupational Safety and Health Act320 treats occupational exposure to toxic
substances as an employment law issue, enacted by legislation that goes through
the congressional labor committees, governed by a statute implemented by the
Department of Labor. The Toxic Substances Control Act,321 however, treats the
same problem as an environmental law issue, enacted by legislation that goes
through the congressional environmental committees and is implemented by EPA.

316. Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985).
317. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-271, pt.1, at 78 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1103, 1180.
318. See S. REP. NO. 99-145, at 14 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1676, 1969–70.
319. See Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) (establishing a permit program
for discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States—a program that
regulates the filling of wetlands).
320. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
321. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2695d (2012).
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Recognizing that the boundaries of environmental law are blurry, not sharp, and
that many situations arising within environmental law—especially those outside of
the canon—also arise within other fields, broadens the array of potential regulatory
options for responding to environmental problems. Policy advocates and
lawmakers decide—usually implicitly—about whether to frame an issue as
environmental or as something else. Making that decision deliberately could create
opportunities for laws that are more reflective of messy realities and better tailored
to our complex needs.
Indeed, full appreciation of the overlap between environmental issues and other
areas of law might induce exploration of how new legal structures can develop to
reflect these blurry boundaries and overlapping legal fields. Jody Freeman and Jim
Rossi, for example, have examined how agencies can beneficially exercise
coordinated concurrent regulatory jurisdiction—what they call “shared regulatory
space.”322 Freeman and Rossi’s discussion of shared regulatory space, including the
tools agencies can use to coordinate their overlapping regulatory jurisdictions and
methods of assessing and improving coordination, is illuminating and instructive.
They do not, however, discuss the ways in which overlapping boundaries of
substantive legal fields—for example, environmental law and safety law—create an
impetus for shared regulatory space, or how the design of shared regulatory space
should reflect overlapping legal fields.323 More work is needed to develop legal
structures and institutions with, for example, capability to address issues that
implicate multiple fields, objectives, and perspectives.
CONCLUSION
The history of environmental law over the last four decades in the United States
provides cause for both optimism and pessimism about the field’s future. The
existing major environmental statutes that comprise the canon of environmental
law have accomplished significant improvements in environmental quality while
proving resilient in the face of sometimes harrowing political headwinds. On the
flip side, however, the canon has calcified over time, proving resistant to reform
and difficult to employ against emerging environmental threats.
If it is to succeed in protecting human health and the environment, the
environmental law of this new century may need to evolve into something that
looks quite different from the extant environmental law canon. The next generation
of environmental laws must be viable for creation and implementation even in an
antagonistic political climate; amenable to integration with other, nonenvironmental law; and able to make inroads against the monumental peril of
global climate change. Environmental laws embedded in larger non-environmental
programs offer an alternative model to the environmental law canon—an
alternative model that seems well suited to a new generation of environmental law.
The major federal pollution statutes that comprise the environmental law canon
will continue to form the centerpiece of American environmental law for the

322. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 198.
323. Cf. Aagaard, supra note 206, at 281–85 (arguing that issues perceived to arise within
multiple legal fields will and should tend to lead to overlapping regulatory jurisdictions).
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foreseeable future. But other environmental laws outside of the canon, and
especially embedded environmental laws, have the potential to play a much greater
role in environmental policy going forward. Such embedded environmental laws
exhibit features quite different from the canonical environmental statutes: whereas
major environmental statutes are large regulatory programs administered by EPA
and focused on environmental protection, embedded environmental laws are
dispersed, relatively small programs that often integrate environmental protection
with other objectives. These features create important functional differences
between the environmental law canon and embedded environmental laws,
differences that in some circumstances give embedded environmental laws
advantages over canonical environmental laws. The small size and narrow scope of
embedded environmental laws, for example, facilitate experimentation and contextspecific policy solutions. Embedded environmental laws can sow the seeds of
future broader changes in the law and can enlist the participation of new
institutional actors with fresh perspectives and additional resources.
Studying embedded and other noncanonical environmental laws also broadens
and deepens our understanding of environmental law as a legal field. Noncanonical
environmental laws are environmental laws but usually not only environmental
laws—they also are labor laws, agriculture laws, or transportation laws as well.
Environmental law should reflect this complicated and messy reality. Attempting to
maintain a set of environmental laws segregated substantively and institutionally
from other fields unduly constrains the project of environmental law, which in its
essence should seek to suffuse environmental concerns into the law generally.
Environmental effects are everywhere in the law, so environmental concerns should
be spread throughout the law as well.

